Kuren v. Luzerne County

146 A.3d 715 (2016)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

Luzerne (D) appointed Flora, Jr. to be Chief Public Defender of OPD. There were serious problems from both understaffing and underfunding. OPD was unable to represent juveniles facing delinquency petitions. Approximately fifty percent of juveniles appearing in D's Juvenile Court were unrepresented. Flora was able to secure funding, but in order to staff this new unit, Flora had to transfer a senior attorney out of the OPD's Adult Unit. D officials rebuffed Flora's request leaving the Adult Unit understaffed to tackle its increasing caseload even though there was money to fund the transferee’s replacement in the Adult division. Flora submitted a report to D about OPS's lack of sufficient resources and funding such that OPD could not in a manner sufficient to satisfy the Public Defender Act, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, or Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Rampant deficiencies included caseloads exceeding national standards; insufficient support staff; insufficient number of attorneys; lack of appellate attorneys; facilities unsuitable for confidential meetings with indigent defendants; and inadequate information technology. Without additional attorneys and support staff, OPD would begin declining applications for representation within 60 days. Flora submitted a recovery plan, and D denied each recommendation. Faced with mounting caseloads and overwhelmed attorneys, Flora directed the OPD to reject applicants who were not incarcerated and who were charged only with minor offenses. In January 2012, D decreased the OPD's funding by approximately 12%. Flora was able to reallocate funds, but that move significantly limited the OPD's ability to retain experts in some matters, including capital cases and complex juvenile proceedings. In early 2012, a number of attorneys resigned from the OPD. D implemented a hiring freeze and could not fill the positions. OPD continued to operate with five unfilled attorney positions. Most of the attorneys who worked for the OPD did not have their own desks, telephones, or computers. One part-time attorney informed Flora that he could not accept any more cases because, due to his current caseload, he could not satisfy his ethical duties to any additional defendants. Flora, in his capacity as Chief Public Defender, along with plaintiffs Samantha Volciak, Yolanda Holman, Charles Hammonds, and on behalf of unnamed but similarly situated individuals, filed a class action lawsuit against D and its County Manager. Other than Flora, the plaintiffs identified themselves as persons charged with crimes, and OPD could not provide them with representation due to inadequate funding and depleted resources. P sought a writ of mandamus to lift the hiring freeze and the criminal plaintiffs brought a claim under the federal Civil Rights Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, seeking an injunction and immediate appointment of private counsel to assist them in their defenses. The trial court eventually issued both a peremptory writ of mandamus and a preliminary injunction. After the pretrial conference, Greenwald was chosen to serve as Chief Public Defender. Flora was formally terminated on April 17, 2013. An amended complaint with Ps replacing the original criminal plaintiffs. The new Ps alleged that OPD's attorneys could not devote to each case, the representation that Ps would receive as their cases progressed would not meet constitutional norms. The prior criminal plaintiffs all had counsel appointed for them during the preliminary stages of the suit. Flora took some great fixes to save money but alas was fired. In the amended complaint, Ps delineated six essential components of competent 'legal representation' that offices servicing indigent defendants require in order to comply with the Sixth Amendment: (1) the attorneys must have adequate knowledge of the relevant areas of the law; (2) the attorneys must be assigned to represent indigent clients at the earliest possible stage; (3) the attorneys must be present at every critical stage of the client's case; (4) the office and attorneys must be able to conduct reasonable factual and legal pre-trial investigations, pursue and comply with the discovery rules, and utilize investigators when necessary; (5) the attorneys must be able to consult with their clients to discuss the material aspects of the case, as well as the client's substantive and procedural rights, to ensure that the client is making informed decisions regarding the case; and (6) the attorneys must be able to perform their work with reasonable diligence and promptness. OPD attorneys frequently were: a. unable to interview or meet with clients prior to preliminary hearings; b. unable to contact their clients between court appearances; c. unable to conduct significant investigation or discovery; d. unable to engage in significant motion practice; e. unable to gather information needed for effective plea negotiations; f. unable to engage in sufficient trial preparation; and g. unable to litigate appeals because of a lack of appellate experience. Ps claim a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ps asserted a violation of the right to counsel enshrined in Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Ds removed the case to federal court. The District Court remanded the matter to state court for disposition. The trial court dismissed the amended complaint. The Commonwealth Court unanimously affirmed the trial court. The Commonwealth Court explained that Flora was not personally aggrieved by D's alleged failure to fund the OPD, and therefore could not establish that he had a 'substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the outcome of the litigation.' It held that Flora also lacked taxpayer standing. As for the criminal plaintiffs, the court explained that per Strickland v. Washington indigent defendants are entitled to effective assistance of counsel; if counsel fails in that duty, the remedy is a new trial. To be entitled to relief under Strickland, a defendant must demonstrate that his attorney 'performed below a standard of objective reasonableness and that counsel's performance resulted in actual prejudice to the defendant.' Such a claim can be brought only after the defendant has been tried and convicted. In some instances, as the United States Supreme Court explained in Cronic, a lawyer's performance falls so far below the constitutional baseline that prejudice can be presumed without an objective examination of trial counsel's actual performance. Still, this too may occur only after the defendant has been convicted. The court rejected that systematic underfunding creates a Sixth Amendment violation, explaining that 'constructive denial of counsel is a branch from the Strickland tree, with Cronic applying only when the appointed attorney's representation is so egregious that it's as if [the] defendant had no attorney at all.' Ps appealed.