Kerrigan v. Commissioner Of Public Health

957 A.2d 407 (2008)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

On August 24, 2004, Ps, eight same sex couples who applied for and were denied marriage licenses by the town of Madison, commenced this action, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Ds. Ps sought a judgment declaring that, to the extent that any statute, regulation or common-law rule precludes otherwise qualified individuals from marrying someone of the same sex, or because they are gay or lesbian couples, such statutes, regulations and common-law rules violate various provisions of the state constitution, including due process and equal protection. The legislature then passed Public Acts 2005, which established the right of same sex partners to enter into civil unions and conferred on such unions all the rights and privileges that are granted to spouses in a marriage. The parties narrowed the issue posed by this action to whether the civil union law and its prohibition against same sex marriage pass muster under the state constitution. Both sides filed summary judgment motions. Ps claimed the state's statutes governing marriage and civil unions violate the due process and equal protection provisions of the state constitution because they deprive gay persons of the fundamental right to marry the person of their choice, and because they discriminate on the basis of both sex and sexual orientation. Ps claim that because marriage is a fundamental right, the state bears the burden of demonstrating that any abridgment of the right has been narrowly tailored to effectuate a compelling state interest, a burden which, D cannot meet. Also by limiting marriage to the union of a man and a woman, the statutory scheme impermissibly segregates on the basis of sex in violation of the express prohibition against such treatment contained in article first, § 20, of the state constitution. Ps claim that, because they are members of a suspect or quasi-suspect class, D cannot discriminate against them in the absence of an exceptionally strong justification for doing so, a justification that the Ps contend does not exist. Ds claim that Ps have failed to demonstrate that they have suffered any harm as a result of the statutory bar against same sex marriage because, under the civil union law, gay persons are entitled to all of the rights that married couples enjoy. Ds also maintain that this state's ban on same sex marriage does not deprive Ps of a fundamental right because, since ancient times, marriage has been understood to be the union of a man and a woman, and only such rights that are 'deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition . . . and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' are deemed to be fundamental. The right that Ps are asserting, namely, the right to marry 'any person of one's choosing,' is not a fundamental right. The right that the plaintiffs were asserting, namely, the right to marry 'any person of one's choosing,' is not a fundamental right. D’s motion was granted and Ps appealed. The Case Books (Wadlington) skips to the Conclusion.