Kerman v. City Of New York

Facts

P had a history of depression and borderline personality disorder. P telephoned his girlfriend Phyllis Landau and stated that he might purchase a gun to commit suicide and might kill his treating psychiatrist, Dr. Morris Brozovsky, as well. Landau knew that P had recently stopped taking antidepressant medication in preparation for his participation in an experimental study conducted by the New York State Psychiatric Institute at Columbia Presbyterian Hospital. She telephoned Dr. Kevin Malone, the psychiatrist in charge of that study, and described her conversation with P. On Dr. Malone's recommendation, Landau then called 911. She gave police the details and physical location but did not give any names nor inform them of her relationship with P. City police officers were told there was an emotionally disturbed person there, possibly with a gun. A team of officers arrived at P's apartment, rang the doorbell, and pounded on the door until P responded. P, who had been in the shower, eventually opened the door a crack wrapped in a towel, whereupon the officers burst through. The door hit P in the head and knocked him to the floor and that, in the process, the towel in which he had wrapped himself came off, leaving him naked. The entry also ruptured a plastic bag of used kitty litter. P became covered in kitty litter when he was knocked to the floor. P was handcuffed, and search produced no gun. Emergency medical services paramedics arrived 30 minutes later. P had remained naked and cuffed. The police officer in charge was sergeant Crossan (D). On D's instructions, the paramedics placed P, still handcuffed, in a 'restraint bag' and took him to Bellevue Hospital. At Bellevue, the cuffs were removed and P was held overnight for observation. He was released the next day. P sued City, D, and eight other City police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The complaint asserted state-law claims principally for battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The judge granted partial summary judgment in favor of all nine police officers, dismissing all of P's claims except those alleging that the officers' actions after they handcuffed P violated his federal constitutional right not to be subjected to excessive force and constituted battery in violation of state law. The Court held that the conduct attributed to Ds was reasonable and that they were thus entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law on Kerman's First Amendment and unlawful seizure claims. The court dismissed P's § 1983 claims against the City for lack of any allegation or evidence that the alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights resulted from any municipal policy or custom. The state-law battery claim against the City was not dismissed; the City does not dispute that it would be liable for intentional state-law torts found to have been committed by the officers. The § 1983 claim against D for excessive force and the state-law claims against D and the City for battery remained for trial. The jury found in favor of all of the officers on the battery claim and in favor of all officers except D on the excessive force claim. The jury awarded P compensatory damages of $75,000 and indicated that punitive damages were warranted. The district court viewed the jury's verdict in favor of D on the battery claim but against him on the excessive force claim as inconsistent, and it instructed the jury to resume deliberations. When the jury thereafter was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the excessive force claim, the court granted a motion by D pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 for judgment as a matter of law dismissing that claim on the ground that D was entitled to qualified immunity. The appellate court affirmed except for P's detention and involuntary hospitalization after the officers had searched for and failed to find a gun and reversed the grant of summary judgment dismissing the First and Fourth Amendment claims against D for, respectively, retaliation and unlawful seizure, as well as the state-law claims against D and the City for false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The qualified-immunity grant of JMOL in favor of D on P's claim for use of excessive force after the officers failed to find a gun was also reversed. The case was remanded. The jury found that P was entitled only to an award of nominal damages on his claims for unlawful seizure and false imprisonment. The jury found that P had not proven that his continued custody or involuntary hospitalization were a proximate cause of injuries. The jury found that Kerman should not be awarded compensatory or punitive damages but that he should be awarded 'nominal damages of one dollar or less.' The Court entered judgment dismissing the complaint in its entirety. P promptly moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 for correction of the judgment to reflect that the jury had found in his favor on the Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure and state-law false imprisonment claims. He also moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 for a new trial with respect to damages on those claims. The district court stated that P's Rule 60 motion 'is granted,' though 'mooted,' and it found no merit in P's Rule 59 motion for a new trial. The Court entered judgment in favor of Ds.

Issues

Rule of Law

Holding and Decision

Legal Analysis

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