Kendrick v. Pippin

252 P.3d 1052 (2011)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

An automobile accident occurred in winter driving conditions. P was stopped at a red light. As D approached the intersection D applied her brakes. When she applied the brakes, her vehicle began to slide, and she realized that she could not stop the vehicle. To avoid a collision with cars that might begin entering the intersection D attempted to make an illegal right turn from her lane instead of continuing in her lane through the intersection. D could not complete the turn and her vehicle went over the center median, struck a traffic sign, and impacted P's vehicle, coming to rest against P's driver's side door. P presented testimony from Officer Roberts that, due to the overnight snowfall, the road conditions in the area were generally slushy and icy and that the road conditions at the intersection were not unexpected but that 'the conditions were pretty much the same everywhere.' He stated that the intersection was 'an average intersection, given the conditions of the snowfall' and that he was not aware of any other accidents at the intersection prior to the parties' collision. D contended that she was surprised by the icy conditions at the intersection, and requested the trial court instruct the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine. The trial court approved the instruction and gave the jury the following sudden emergency instruction: 'A person who, through no fault of his or her own, is placed in a sudden emergency, is not chargeable with negligence if the person exercises that degree of care which a reasonably careful person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances.' P sought to instruct the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and submitted the following proposed instruction: 'Presumptions' are legal rules based upon experience or public policy and established in the law to help the jury decide the case. When the driver of a motor vehicle hits another which is stopped, the law presumes that the driver was negligent. The trial court rejected the proposed instruction, reasoning that 'this fact situation here has no basis, neither in the statute nor common law which has created a presumption' of negligence. The jury found that D was not negligent in causing the accident in which her vehicle struck P's. P filed a motion for a new trial based on allegations that, during deliberations, the jury foreperson, a licensed engineer, performed calculations regarding D's speed, distance, and reaction time which she shared with the other jurors. P claimed the foreperson had informed the other jurors that she was an engineer and had concluded that D did not have enough time to avoid the collision. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial. The court of appeals affirmed. P appealed.