Nature of the Case
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Facts
D was the record owner of a parcel of land. Access from this parcel of land to Briar Brae Road was provided by a fourteen-foot-wide strip of land, most of it owned by D, running in a westerly direction from the road to the parcel of land. The land was subdivided into two parcels, labeled 'B' and 'D.' Parcel B was conveyed to a neighboring landowner in exchange for parcel C. Parcel C is precipitous, consists of ledge, is heavily wooded, and is approximately fifty-five feet wide running from parcel D in a northerly direction and fronting on Briar Brae Road. The subdivision had no effect on the shape or ownership of the fourteen-foot-wide strip of land. Ladestro (D) and his wife contracted for the purchase of a parcel of land which included lot D, lot C and the interest held by D in the fourteen-foot-wide strip of land. It was contingent on the acquisition of a building permit authorizing the construction of a single-family residence on lot D. The permit was approved Ladestro commenced construction of his house on lot D. Karl sued and lost his bid for a temporary injunction. P has close to $135,000 in construction done on the property. Ps in both cases own property abutting the fourteen-foot-wide strip of land and have a right-of-way over that strip of land as their only access to Briar Brae Road. Altogether there five residences total along the right-of-way, using it as access to the main road. Ladestro would be the sixth user of the right-of-way. The central complaint is that the right-of-way is inadequate for use by six families and that such an excessive use would result in irreparable injury to them. The trial court ruled that the zoning ordinance had been violated and issued an injunction but refused mandamus against the zoning inspector to revoke Ladestro’s permit. Both sides appealed.
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