Jones v. Clinton

Facts

Jones (P) filed this lawsuit seeking civil damages from Clinton, President of the United States, (D) and Danny Ferguson, a former Arkansas State Police Officer, for alleged actions beginning with an incident in a hotel suite in Little Rock, Arkansas on May 8, 1991, when D was Governor of the State of Arkansas. P was working as a state employee on the day in question and claimed that D persuaded her to leave the registration desk she was staffing and visit D in a business suite at the hotel. P claimed the Governor made boorish and offensive sexual advances that she rejected and that her superiors at work subsequently dealt with her in a hostile and rude manner and punished her in a tangible way for rejecting those advances. P's complaint was filed on May 6, 1994. D filed a motion to dismiss the complaint without prejudice on grounds of immunity and to toll any statutes of limitations until he is no longer President, thereby allowing P to refile her suit after he is out of office. On December 28, 1994, this Court denied D's motion to dismiss on immunity grounds and ruled that discovery in the case could proceed, but concluded, that any trial should be stayed until such time as D is no longer in office. Both parties appealed. On January 9, 1996, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed this Court's Order denying D's motion to dismiss on immunity grounds and allowing discovery to proceed, but reversed this Court's Order staying the trial of this matter for the duration of D's term in office. D filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States, which was granted. The Supreme Court handed down an opinion holding that there is no constitutional impediment to allowing P's case to proceed while D is in office. D then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). The Court dismissed P's defamation claim against D, dismissed her due process claim for deprivation of a property interest in her State employment, and dismissed her due process claims for deprivation of a liberty interest based on false imprisonment and injury to reputation, but concluded the remaining claims in P's complaint stated viable causes of action. During the course of discovery, over 50 motions were filed, the Court entered some 30 Orders, and phone conferences were held on an almost weekly basis to address various disputes and resolve motions. In addition, the Court traveled to Washington, D.C. at the request of D to preside over his civil deposition on January 17, 1998. It was at a hearing on January 12, 1998, to address issues surrounding D's deposition and at the deposition itself that the Court first learned of Monica Lewinsky, a former White House intern and employee, and her alleged involvement in this case. D was questioned extensively about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, this Court having previously ruled on December 11, 1997, that P was 'entitled to information regarding any individuals with whom D had sexual relations or proposed or sought to have sexual relations and who were during the relevant time frame state or federal employees.' This Court overruled objections during the deposition from D's attorney, Robert S. Bennett, that questions concerning Ms. Lewinsky were inappropriate areas of inquiry and required that such questions be answered by D. D testified in response to questioning from P's counsel and his own attorney that he had no recollection of having ever been alone with Ms. Lewinsky, and he denied that he had engaged in an 'extramarital sexual affair,' in 'sexual relations,' or in a 'sexual relationship' with Ms. Lewinsky. Ms. Lewinsky likewise denied by affidavit that she and D had engaged in a sexual relationship. When asked by Mr. Bennett whether Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit denying a sexual relationship with D was a 'true and accurate statement,' D answered, 'That is absolutely true.' D's denial of a sexual relationship with Ms. Lewinsky at his deposition was consistent with his answer of 'None' in response to P's Interrogatory No. 10, which requested the name of each and every federal employee with whom he had sexual relations when he was President of the United States. On the afternoon of January 28, 1998, with less than 48 hours remaining in the period for conducting discovery, OIC filed with this Court a motion for limited intervention and stay of discovery in this civil case. OIC argued that counsel for P were deliberately shadowing the grand jury's investigation of the matter involving Ms. Lewinsky and that 'the pending criminal investigation is of such gravity and paramount importance that this Court would do a disservice to the Nation if it were to permit the unfettered -- and extraordinarily aggressive -- discovery efforts currently underway to proceed unabated.' The Court concluded that the parties could continue with discovery in the short time that remained of those matters not involving Ms. Lewinsky, but that any discovery that did involve Ms. Lewinsky would not be allowed to go forward and, further, that any evidence concerning Ms. Lewinsky would be excluded from the trial of this matter. Following the completion of discovery, D and Ferguson each filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. By Memorandum Opinion and Order dated April 1, 1998, this Court granted the President's and Ferguson's motions for summary judgment and entered judgment dismissing this case. The Court concluded that there were no genuine issues for trial in this case and that Ds were entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to P's claims that she was subjected to quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harassment, that Ds conspired to deprive her of her civil rights, and that she suffered emotional distress so severe in nature that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. P appealed. D appeared before a grand jury in Washington, D.C., as part of OIC's criminal investigation and testified about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky and his actions during this civil lawsuit. D discussed the matter in a televised address to the Nation. In his address, D stated that although his answers at his January 17th deposition were 'legally accurate,' he did not volunteer information and that he did indeed have a relationship with Ms. Lewinsky that was inappropriate and wrong. D acknowledged misleading people, in part because the questions posed to him 'were being asked in a politically inspired lawsuit which has since been dismissed,' and because he 'had real and serious concerns about an Independent Counsel investigation that began with private business dealings 20 years ago....' It was during the President's televised address that the Court first learned D may be in contempt. On September 9, 1998, the Independent Counsel, having concluded there was substantial and credible information that the President committed acts that may constitute grounds for impeachment, submitted his findings from his investigation of the Lewinsky matter to the United States House of Representatives pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 595(c). The House of Representatives thereupon commenced impeachment proceedings, ultimately passing two Articles of Impeachment against D, one alleging perjury in his August 17th testimony before the grand jury and the other alleging obstruction of justice in this civil case. The matter then proceeded to trial in the United States Senate. While the impeachment proceedings were taking place in the House of Representatives, P reached an out-of-court settlement for $850,000.00 and withdrew her appeal of this Court's April 1st decision granting summary judgment to Ds. Thereafter, on February 12, 1999, the Senate acquitted the President of both Articles of Impeachment. This Court held a telephone conference on February 16, 1999, to address the remaining issues before this Court, including the issue of attorney's fees and the issue of whether D should be subject to contempt proceedings. The Court explained that even though this litigation begat the controversy that was the subject of D's impeachment trial in the Senate, the interests protected by the contempt authority of the Court are significantly different from the interests protected by the impeachment process. The Court stated that the contempt authority protects the integrity of a court's proceedings and provides a means of enforcement of its orders, while impeachment is a constitutional process in which the proper inquiry is D's fitness to serve in office.

Issues

Rule of Law

Holding and Decision

Legal Analysis

© 2007-2024 ABN Study Partner.