Jennings v. Rodriguez

138 S. Ct. 830 (2018)

Facts

Congress has authorized immigration officials to detain some classes of aliens during the course of certain immigration proceedings. Detention during those proceedings gives immigration officials time to determine an alien’s status without running the risk of the alien either absconding or engaging in criminal activity before a final decision can be made. Under 122 Stat. 867, 8 U. S. C. §1225, an alien who “arrives in the United States,” or “is present” in this country but “has not been admitted,” is treated as “an applicant for admission.” §1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission must “be inspected by immigration officers” to ensure that they may be admitted into the country consistent with U. S. immigration law. §1225(a)(3). Applicants for admission fall into one of two categories, those covered by §1225(b)(1) and those covered by §1225(b)(2). Section 1225(b)(1) applies to aliens initially determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation. Section 1225(b)(1) also applies to certain other aliens designated by the Attorney General in his discretion. See §1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). Section 1225(b)(2) is broader. It serves as a catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by §1225(b)(1) (with specific exceptions not relevant here). See §§1225(b)(2)(A), (B). Aliens covered by §1225(b)(1) are normally ordered removed “without further hearing or review” pursuant to an expedited removal process. But if a §1225(b)(1) alien “indicates either an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution,” then that alien is referred for an asylum interview. §1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). If an immigration officer determines after that interview that the alien has a credible fear of persecution, “the alien shall be detained for further consideration of the application for asylum.” Aliens who are covered by §1225(b)(2) are detained pursuant to a different process. Those aliens “shall be detained for a [removal] proceeding” if an immigration officer “determines that [they are] not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted” into the country. §1225(b)(2)(A). Applicants for admission may be temporarily released on parole “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” §1182(d)(5)(A). Such parole “shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien.” 8 U. S. C. §1182(d)(5)(A). Instead, when the purpose of the parole has been served, “the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” An alien present in the country may still be removed if he or she falls “within one or more . . . classes of deportable aliens.” §1227(a). That includes aliens who were inadmissible at the time of entry or who have been convicted of certain criminal offenses since admission. Section 1226 governs the process of arresting and detaining that group of aliens pending their removal. Section 1226 distinguishes between two different categories of aliens. The Attorney General may issue a warrant for the arrest and detention of an alien “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” §1226(a). “Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section,” the Attorney General “may release” an alien detained under §1226(a) “on bond . . . or conditional parole.” Under §1226(c), the “Attorney General shall take into custody any alien” who falls into one of several enumerated categories involving criminal offenses and terrorist activities. §1226(c)(1). The Attorney General may release aliens in those categories “only if the Attorney General decides . . . that release of the alien from custody is necessary” for witness-protection purposes and “the alien satisfies the Attorney General that the alien will not pose a danger to the safety of other persons or of property and is likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding.” §1226(c)(2). Any release under those narrow conditions “shall take place in accordance with a procedure that considers the severity of the offense committed by the alien.” The law allows the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings under §§1226(a) and (c).


Rodriguez (P) is a Mexican citizen. Since 1987, he has also been a lawful permanent resident of the United States. In April 2004, after P was convicted of a drug offense and theft of a vehicle, the Government detained him under §1226 and sought to remove him from the country. P argued both that he was not removable and, in the alternative, that he was eligible for relief from removal. An Immigration Judge ordered P deported to Mexico. The Board of Immigration Appeals agreed that P was subject to mandatory removal. P petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for review of the Board’s decision. P then filed a habeas petition in the District Court alleging that he was entitled to a bond hearing to determine whether his continued detention was justified. The District Court certified the following class: “All non-citizens who: (1) are or were detained for longer than six months pursuant to one of the general immigration detention statutes pending completion of removal proceedings, including judicial review, (2) are not and have not been detained pursuant to a national security detention statute, and (3) have not been afforded a hearing to determine whether their detention is justified.” The District Court organized the class into four subclasses based on the four “general immigration detention statutes” under which it understood the class members to be detained: Sections 1225(b), 1226(a), 1226(c), and 1231(a). The Court of Appeals held that the §1231(a) subclass had been improperly certified. P argued that -§§1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c)-do not authorize “prolonged” detention in the absence of an individualized bond hearing at which the Government proves by clear and convincing evidence that the class member’s detention remains justified. Without a bond-hearing requirement, P claims those three provisions would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court entered a permanent injunction in line with the relief sought by Ps, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Under the canon of constitutional avoidance, the Court of Appeals construed §§1225(b) and 1226(c) as imposing an implicit 6-month time limit on an alien’s detention under these sections. After that point, the Court of Appeals held, that the Government may continue to detain the alien only under the authority of §1226(a). The Court of Appeals then construed §1226(a) to mean that an alien must be given a bond hearing every six months and that detention beyond the initial 6-month period is permitted only if the Government proves by clear and convincing evidence that further detention is justified.