Jenkins Brick Company v. Bremer

321 F.3d 1366 (11th Cir. 2003)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

P wanted to expand its Alabama-based operations into the Savannah, Georgia area. D, a Savannah native who had spent many years working in the brick business that his family owned since 1914, proved to be an ideal candidate to help P facilitate this expansion. P hired D to sell brick and block throughout the sales territory that consisted of a fifty-mile radius around Savannah. A non-compete agreement was presented to D in Savannah. D was told that his signature was a necessary condition of his continued employment with the company. The agreement prohibited a variety of competitive practices, including all competition with D within a fifty-mile radius of any P office or plant for the two years following the conclusion of D's employment. It prevented D from soliciting business from any existing or prospective customer with whom D had contact during his tenure as an employee. It was to be governed by Alabama law and stated that it was executed in Alabama. In February 2001, when D voluntarily tendered his resignation. He immediately began working for a Savannah competitor in violation of the non-compete agreement. P sued D in Alabama, seeking injunctive and monetary relief. D moved to dismiss the case for lack of venue or, alternatively, to transfer the case to the Southern District of Georgia. The district court transferred the case to the Southern District of Georgia under §1404(a), implicitly holding that venue was proper in Alabama and explicitly holding that the Georgia court would be a more convenient forum. D moved the court for summary judgment. The Erie doctrine generally requires district courts to apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum state, and D urged the court to look to Georgia law for the rule of decision. Under Georgia law, the non-compete agreement was unenforceable. P urged the court to adhere to the Alabama court's implicit determination that venue was properly laid in Alabama. D wanted the court to apply the substantive law of the transferor court (i.e., Alabama law) and enforce the non-compete agreement. D concedes that if venue did not lie in Alabama, then the district court would have to apply Georgia's choice-of-law rules and Georgia substantive law. It held that venue in Alabama was improper under §1391(a)(2). It granted D's motion for summary judgment. P appealed. P argues that the court failed to give appropriate deference to the Alabama district court pursuant to the so-called 'law-of-the-case' doctrine. The Alabama court made a 'ruling' that venue in Alabama was proper when it transferred the case to Georgia under §1404(a) rather than §1406(a), and under the law of the case unless the decision was 'clearly erroneous and would work manifest injustice it had to be obeyed.'