P and D made a decision to cohabitate. In obtaining the $7,000 down payment for the purchase of the house, P testified that D secured a $5,000 loan from her credit union and P sold her automobile for $2,000. P testified that they planned to purchase the house in both names if at all possible and that it was not until they went to sign the closing papers at the escrow office that they discovered that both names did not appear on the contract. P claimed they decided that D should sign the papers as written and that they would be corrected at another time. Thereafter, the parties on numerous occasions discussed changing title to both names, but, they 'never got around to doing it.' At deposition, P had testified that, near to the time they purchased the house, they decided to take title solely in D's name in order to provide her with a tax shelter for her higher wages. D claimed the parties had an express oral agreement to pool their resources, each paying 50 percent of everything, and if P contributed 50 percent of the house payments, then when the house was sold, P would get 50 percent of the equity. D admitted that P had contributed $2,000 from the sale of P's automobile toward the $7,000 down payment on the house; at another point, D stated that P had contributed nothing to the house and that the automobile which allegedly was sold by P for her $2,000 contribution was not owned by P, but by D. Several witnesses corroborated P's testimony that the parties bought the house together. P and D maintained a joint checking account, a joint savings account, and a safety deposit box, and that they had joint loans and two joint credit cards. Their practice was to deposit their paychecks into their joint checking account and from this account to pay their bills, including the house payment. P had in fact made most of the numerous, and substantial household improvements P had claimed. D moved out of the house in August 1978. In October 1978, D returned after P had vacated the premises. The court found that both P and are unreliable witnesses whose testimony is false in parts and is unreliable in parts unless corroborated by other evidence. It held that they agreed to pool their assets for their joint use during the period of their relationship, which terminated on August 31, 1978. It held that D purchased the house. The trial court held that P’s contributions to the purchase and improvement of the home were presumed to be gifts (which the court decided on its own, sua sponte) It held that D was not legally required to account to P for her use of the property after the termination of their relationship and that P does not owe Dt any of the sums alleged in Ds counterclaims. The court denied relief to either party. This appeal resulted.