Police arrested Timothy, then twenty-one years old, and charged him with OUI, operating a motor vehicle after suspension, speeding, and operating an unregistered motor vehicle. Police discovered a partially full quart of vodka in the vehicle. After failing a field sobriety test, Timothy was taken to the police station where he submitted to two breathalyzer tests which registered .10 and .12 respectively. Timothy and his father consulted with three lawyers, who offered to represent Timothy for fees between $3,000 and $10,000. The father went to D's home to service an alarm system which he had installed several years before. While there, he discussed the arrest with D's wife who invited them to discuss the case with D. D, whom the hearing committee described as a 'very experienced senior trial attorney with impressive credentials,' told Timothy that he had never represented a client in a driving while under the influence case or in any criminal matter, and he had never tried a case in the District Court. The hearing committee found that 'D explained that although he lacked experience in this area, he was a knowledgeable and hard-working attorney and that he believed he could competently represent Timothy. D described himself as 'efficient and economical in the use of [his] time.'. . . D told Timothy that he worked on a time charge basis and that he billed monthly. The father had indicated that he would pay Timothy's legal fees.' After the meeting, the father hired D to represent Timothy. The bills totaled $50,022.25, reflecting 227 hours of billed time, 153 hours of which were expended by D and seventy-four of which were his associates' time. The father did not pay the first two bills when they became due and expressed to D his concern about their amount. The father paid $10,000 on June 20, 1989. D then assured them that most of the work had been completed 'other than taking [the case] to trial.' No subsequent payments were made. D requested the father to sign a promissory note evidencing his debt to D. The father did so. D then added a charge of $5,000 as a 'retroactive increase' in fees. On November 7, 1989, after the case was completed, D sent a bill for $15,000. It was found that D's fee was not clearly excessive. The complaint was dismissed, and P appealed.