In Re Eichner

420 N.E.2d 64 (1981)

Facts

In these two cases the guardians of incompetent patients objected to the continued use of medical treatments or measures to prolong the lives of the patients who were diagnosed as fatally ill with no reasonable chance of recovery. 


In Matter of Eichner, Brother Fox, an 83-year-old member of the Society of Mary, was being maintained by a respirator in a permanent vegetative state. The local director of the society applied to have the respirator removed on the ground that it was against the patient's wishes as expressed prior to his becoming incompetent. Brother Fox was 83 years old and had an operation for a hernia. While the operation was being performed on October 1, 1979, he suffered cardiac arrest, with resulting loss of oxygen to the brain and substantial brain damage. He was placed on a respirator which maintained him in a vegetative state. After retaining two neurosurgeons who confirmed the diagnosis, Father Eichner requested the hospital to remove the respirator. The hospital refused to do so without court authorization. Father Eichner then applied, pursuant to article 78 of the Mental Hygiene Law, to be appointed guardian of the person and property of Brother Fox, with authority to direct removal of the respirator. The application was supported by the patient's 10 nieces and nephews, his only surviving relatives. The court-appointed a guardian ad litem and directed that notice be served on various parties, including the District Attorney. All the experts agreed, that there was no reasonable likelihood that Brother Fox would ever emerge from the vegetative coma or recover his cognitive powers. Eichner submitted evidence that Brother Fox t had made it known that under these circumstances he would want a respirator removed. The court agreed with Eichner. The Appellate Division held that the patient's right to decline treatment was not only guaranteed by the common law but by the Constitution as well. It also found that this right should not be lost when a patient becomes incompetent and, if a patient has not made his wishes known while competent as Brother Fox had done, an appropriate person should be appointed to express the right on his behalf by use of 'substituted judgment.'


In Matter of Storar, a State official applied for permission to administer blood transfusions to a profoundly retarded 52-year-old man with terminal cancer of the bladder. The patient's mother, who was also his legal guardian, refused consent on the ground that the transfusions would only prolong his discomfort and would be against his wishes if he were competent. Mrs. Storar cross-petitioned for an order prohibiting the transfusions, and named the District Attorney as a party. The court-appointed a guardian ad litem and signed an order temporarily permitting the transfusions to continue, pending the determination of the proceeding. All the experts concurred that John Storar had irreversible cancer of the bladder, which by then had spread to his lungs and perhaps other organs, with a very limited life span, generally estimated to be between 3 and 6 months. They also agreed that he had an infant's mentality and was unable to comprehend his predicament or to make a reasoned choice of treatment. After the transfusions, he had more energy. He was able to resume most of his usual activities -- feeding himself, showering, taking walks, and running -- including some mischievous ones, such as stealing cigarette butts and attempting to eat them. John Storar found the transfusions disagreeable. He was also distressed by the blood and blood clots in his urine which apparently increased immediately after a transfusion. To eliminate his apprehension he was given a sedative approximately one hour before a transfusion. He also received regular doses of narcotics to alleviate the pain associated with the disease. The court denied the center's request. The court emphasized that the transfusions could not cure the disease, involved some pain and that the patient submitted to them reluctantly. The court held that a person has a right to determine what will be done with his own body and, when he is incompetent, this right may be exercised by another on his behalf. In this case, the court found that John Storar's mother was the person in the best position to determine what he would want and that she 'wants his suffering to stop and believes that he would want this also.' The Appellate Division affirmed.