Hukill v. Oklahoma Native American Domestic Violence Coalition

542 F.3d 794 (10th Cir. 2008)

Facts

P worked for D as a grant writer and staff attorney until her employment was terminated. P filed a lawsuit in Oklahoma state court against Ds. P voluntarily dismissed her state-law action and filed this federal-court action against the same Ds two months later. P's counsel contacted the lawyer who represented Ds in the state-court action to inquire whether he would accept service on behalf of his clients. Their lawyer responded that his clients would not authorize him to do so. P elected to serve by following state law wherein 'service by mail shall be accomplished by mailing a copy of the summons and petition by certified mail, return receipt requested and delivery restricted to the addressee.' P mailed both summonses to the D business address. One summons was addressed to 'Pauline Musgrove c/o Spirits of Hope Coalition' and was marked for restricted delivery. The other summons was addressed to 'Spirits of Hope Coalition c/o Pauline Musgrove' and was not marked for restricted delivery. Ms. Musgrove was the executive director of D and its registered agent for service of process, but she did not sign for either delivery. L. Vollintine signed and was not an employee, officer, board member, or director of, or an agent authorized to receive service of process on behalf of, D. None of the other Ds who were served by P were employees, officers, or directors of, or agents authorized to accept service of process for, D. Ds failed to respond to the complaint, and P moved for default judgment. The district court granted the motion and entered judgment jointly and severally, for more than $ 100,000. Ds filed a motion to set aside the default judgment against them under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) and 60(b) claiming that the judgment was void because they were never properly served. Ds claim the statutes prescribing the manner of service must be strictly complied with. The district court held that substantial compliance is the proper standard under Oklahoma law and more than a reasonable probability exists that Ds had actual notice of the civil action. Ds appealed.