Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft

14 N.E.2d 798 (1938)

Purchase the Printed Copy at bsmsphd.com

Nature of the Case

To access this section all you need to do is click here and register.

Facts

P, a German National, and Jew entered into an employment contract beginning January 1, 1932, with Schenker & Co. Schenker was controlled by D. The contract was for services to be performed in Germany and other locations outside New York. The contract provides that 'in the event P should die or become unable, without fault on his part, to serve during the period of the contract Ds would pay to him or his heirs the sum of 120,000 marks. In April 1933, P was arrested and interned in a concentration camp by the German government. He was kept there for six months. The German government also passed laws requiring that non-Aryans be terminated from employment. On June 21, 1933, D discharged P as of October 31, 1933. P sued D in New York. P's first cause of action alleges that on June 21, 1933, D discharged P as of October 31, 1933, upon the sole ground that he is a Jew and that as the result of such discharge he was damaged in a sum upwards of $50,000. The second cause of action alleges that in April 1933, the German government incarcerated P in prison and a concentration camp for about six months, that his imprisonment was not brought about by any act or fault of P but solely by reason of the policy of the government which required the elimination of all persons of Jewish blood from leading commercial, industrial and transportation enterprises, that as a result 'plaintiff became unable, without any fault on his part, to continue his services from April 1933,' and has been damaged in the sum of $50,000. D answered in defense claiming that it was required by German Law to terminate P and that German law controlled because the contract was entirely made and performed there. The Special Term granted P's motion to strike this defense and the Appellate Division affirmed. The following questions were certified: 1. Is the second separate defense contained in the answer of D, sufficient in law upon the face thereof? 2. Does the complaint herein state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action?