Nature of the Case
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Facts
The authority to designate an entity a 'foreign terrorist organization' rests with the Secretary of State. Ps are two U.S. citizens and six domestic organizations. Ps claimed that they wished to provide support for the humanitarian and political activities of the PKK and the LTTE, but that they could not do so for fear of prosecution under § 2339B. Ps claimed that the material-support statute violated their freedom of speech and freedom of association under the First Amendment in that it did not require the Government to prove that Ps had a specific intent to further the unlawful ends of those organizations. Ps also argued that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. Ps moved for a preliminary injunction, which the District Court granted in part. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals agreed that the terms 'personnel' and 'training' were vague because it was 'easy to imagine protected expression that falls within the bounds' of those terms. The District Court entered a permanent injunction against applying to Ps the bans on 'personnel' and 'training' support. Congress amended the definition of 'material support or resources' to add the term 'expert advice or assistance.' Ps then filed a second action challenging the constitutionality of that term as applied to them. D argued that Ps lacked standing and that their preenforcement claims were not ripe. The District Court held that Ps' claims were justiciable. It then held that the term 'expert advice or assistance' was impermissibly vague. The Ninth Circuit granted en banc rehearing of the panel's 2003 decision in Ps' first action (involving the terms 'personnel' and 'training'). Congress again amended § 2339B and the definition of 'material support or resources.' Congress clarified the mental state necessary to violate § 2339B, requiring knowledge of the foreign group's designation as a terrorist organization or the group's commission of terrorist acts. Congress also added the term 'service' to the definition of 'material support or resources,' and defined 'training' to mean 'instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge.' It also defined 'expert advice or assistance' to mean 'advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.' It clarified the scope of the term 'personnel' in that no person may be prosecuted under [§ 2339B] in connection with the term `personnel' unless that person has knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or conspired to provide a foreign terrorist organization with 1 or more individuals (who may be or include himself) to work under that terrorist organization's direction or control or to organize, manage, supervise, or otherwise direct the operation of that organization. Individuals who act entirely independently of the foreign terrorist organization to advance its goals or objectives shall not be considered to be working under the foreign terrorist organization's direction and control.' § 2339B(h). The en banc court affirmed the rejection of Ps' First Amendment claims and vacated the panel's 2003 judgment with respect to vagueness, and remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. It also remanded the pending appeal in light of new IRTPA. The parties moved for summary judgment, and the District Court granted partial relief to Ps on vagueness grounds. The Court of Appeals affirmed once more. The court held that, as applied to Ps, the terms 'training,' 'expert advice or assistance' (when derived from 'other specialized knowledge'), and 'service' were vague because they 'continued to cover constitutionally protected advocacy,' but the term 'personnel' was not vague because it 'no longer criminalized pure speech protected by the First Amendment.' D petitioned for certiorari, and plaintiffs filed a conditional cross-petition. Ps challenge § 2339B's prohibition on four types of material support-'training,' 'expert advice or assistance,' 'service,' and 'personnel.' Ps claim that § 2339B violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because these four statutory terms are impermissibly vague. Ps claim that § 2339B violates their freedom of speech under the First Amendment. Ps claim that § 2339B violates their First Amendment freedom of association.
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