Nature of the Case
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Facts
P filed suit against D claiming that the Method of Execution Act of 2009 (MEA), violates the separation-of-powers doctrine in article 4 of the Arkansas Constitution. P was scheduled to be executed on March 16, 2010. P asked the court to grant preliminary injunctive relief to stay his execution during the pendency of the case, to enter declaratory judgment that P's execution pursuant to the MEA was unconstitutional, and to grant permanent injunctive relief barring Jones's execution until passage of a new statute incorporating standards to satisfy the Arkansas Constitution. D filed a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6). It argued the statute set forth general execution provisions but left the details to the director of D. The circuit court entered an order granting D's motion to dismiss and dismissed claims two, three, four, five, and six of Ps' amended complaints. It denied D's motion as to the separation-of-powers claim. Ps filed a supplemental complaint arguing that D intended to execute them using 'chemicals obtained from an overseas driving school purporting to distribute drugs from a non-FDA approved manufacturing source.' Ps now claimed (1) that use of non-FDA approved chemicals purchased from a foreign driving school violated the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment; (2) that D was suppressing information necessary to scrutinize the identity, strength, quality, and purity of the drugs obtained in violation of the due process clauses contained in the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) that use of the non-FDA approved drugs obtained from a foreign driving school would violate the prisoners' rights to due process and rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. D filed a motion for summary judgment claiming Ps could not provide any evidence that the use of the non-FDA approved chemicals created any substantial risk of serious harm and the statute could be applied constitutionally and provided sufficient guidance to executive officials in administering executions. Ps filed a cross-motion for summary judgment asserting that the MEA delegates policymaking discretion to D without setting forth reasonable standards for the exercise of that discretion in violation of the separation-of-powers. D filed a second motion for summary judgment claiming that it had disposed of all lethal chemicals that it had received from the overseas supplier, Dream Pharma and that it was unable to obtain any additional chemicals from that supplier. The court found the MEA unconstitutional. The court granted in part D's second motion for summary judgment, finding that the motion was granted in all respects except that D was enjoined from using any sodium thiopental obtained in violation of any state or federal law. D filed a notice of appeal and Ps filed a notice of cross-appeal. D argues that the doctrine of separation of powers is not violated where the legislature merely makes law and then confers authority or discretion with regard to execution of that law to the executive branch. Ps maintain that because the MEA provides no guidelines for D in carrying out lethal-injection executions and allows D unfettered discretion in determining the chemicals to be used and the policies and procedures for administering lethal injection, it is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
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