Henry v. Dalton

Facts

Ps purchased a house on Carver Street in the city of Pawtucket and within a month thereafter D's husband purchased the adjoining property. It further appears that the distance between the foundations of both houses is approximately 14.5 feet, only 5.8 feet which is the property of Ps. It is mutually agreed that at the time the parties purchased their respective properties a wooden fence separated the properties along the boundary lines. A few years later this fence was taken down and replaced by a hedge, which although planted by D's husband was a joint venture, and P and D each contributed one half of its cost. Prior to 1938 D and her husband owned a garage in the rear of their property, which from time to time was rented to different tenants, one of whom was P. Access to the garage was had over the property of D between her house and the hedge. In 1938 P spoke to D's husband about removing the hedge from the boundary line and making common use of their respective properties as a driveway. P explained that he wished to construct a two-car garage at the rear of his property since he and his son each had a car. D readily gave his permission and D states in her deposition that her husband advised her of the request and his consent. The hedge was removed and P filled in their own strip to bring it up to grade with their neighbors' land. P constructed a two-car garage at the rear of their property. It is undisputed that until sometime in 1957 P and D and their friends used the driveway freely without incident and relations between the parties were friendly and harmonious. In 1954 D and her husband placed two posts in the driveway with a chain between them to prevent strangers from backing in and out. It appears that this was done because D was concerned for the safety of their grandchildren. This measure was taken without consulting P. P testified that relations remained as friendly as ever. In November 1956 P negotiated for the sale of their home. D assured P that there would be no trouble with the driveway in the sale. In November 1956 P called on D and requested that they execute an instrument which would have granted an easement in the driveway, with covenants for each of the parties to maintain one-half thereof and binding on them, their heirs and assigns forever. D, who at that time was seriously ill and died the following January, refused to execute the agreement stating that signing it was out of the question and he intended to close the driveway. William Dalton died in January 1957. Relations between P and D became strained. In September 1957 P continued to use the driveway but P and D exchanged words and two days thereafter Ps were notified by D's attorney that, unless the wishes of his client regarding the use of the driveway were respected, permission for its use by complainants would be withdrawn. On December 4, 1957, P brought their bill of complaint in equity. Ps make no claim that they have acquired an easement by adverse use. Ps contend that a license even though orally granted becomes irrevocable when the licensee, relying on the parol agreement, changes his position by making alterations on Ps property. Ps argue that in such circumstances withdrawal of the permission by the licensor would constitute 'fraud' within the meaning of proceedings in equity. Ps claim they expended money and labor in bringing the grade of their property up to D's property and constructed a garage, ingress and egress which depended upon the permanence of the license, they had changed their position in reliance upon their understanding so that the license became executed and by the rule adopted in some jurisdictions was irrevocable. Ps acknowledge that the authorities are divided on the question. A decree was entered denying and dismissing the bill. Ps appealed. 

Issues

Rule of Law

Holding and Decision

Legal Analysis

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