Hall v. Hall

604 S.W.2d 851 (1980)

Facts

T. A. Hall conveyed three tracts of land by warranty deed to his wife, P. In the granting clause of this deed, the grantor stated:] I do this day Give and bequeath my Entire Right and title to the following described tracks (sic) of land to wit (property described). Later in the habendum clause, he states: [the] condition of this deed is as follows: In case I, T.A. Hall should die before my wife and leave her a widow then she shall have full control and full power to handle or do just as she should see fit with the above-described property just so long as she lives my widow but if she should ever marry any other man then this deed becomes void to her and the above-described property shall fall to my children. T. A. Hall died in 1957. On August 16, 1978, P still a widow, and numerous family members including children, daughters-in-law, and grandchildren, conveyed the land by deed to Ronnie and Randall Dixon (Ps) in the present action. Ds one of the plaintiff's daughters-in-law and several grandchildren opposed the devise. Ps brought this suit in chancery court to determine the nature and extent of their estate, alleging that P held a fee simple absolute estate and that the Dixons derivatively held a similar estate. Ds claimed that Ps held the land in a fee simple subject to a conditional limitation or executory interest and not in fee simple absolute. Ds contend that the Dixons' (Ps) ownership of the property is subject to the condition that P not remarry. The Chancellor held that Ds failed to overcome the presumption that T. A. Hall had given P a fee simple absolute, created in T.C.A. § 64-501, which provides: Every grant or devise of real estate, or any interest therein shall pass all the estate or interest of the granter or devisor unless the intent to pass a less estate or interest shall appear by express terms, or be necessarily implied in the terms of the instrument. The appeals court affirmed. It concluded that where the conveyance is accompanied by an unlimited power of disposition in the grantee, the future interest created in or limitation over to a third party, i.e., the children in the present case, was void. Ds appealed.