Hadacheck v. Sebastian

239 U.S. 394 (1915)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

Los Angeles passed an ordinance prohibiting the operation of brick kilns in certain areas of town. Hadacheck's (P) business was affected by this ordinance even though he had been operating before the ordinance took effect and his land had been outside the city and had been annexed into the city. P was convicted of a misdemeanor for the violation of the ordinance. P had a fine source of clay on his property that was good for brick making and he had dug up his land to that end which harmed the land for other uses. P claimed that he had bought the land when it was outside of the city limits and he had no expectation that the city would ever annex his land. P claimed that his business was not a nuisance as defined under the state statutes. There was no noise, no noxious odors and but only an extremely small amount of smoke was emitted, and even that had dissipated before it left his property. P also states that for the seven years his kiln was running there were no complaints. He claimed that his land was worth $800,000 with the business. If the ordinance disallowed his business, the land value would not be worth more than $60,000. P also had erected expensive machinery for the manufacture of bricks. P claimed that this decrease in value represented a taking of his property without compensation. P also claims that the city is over 107 square miles and 75% of that area is devoted to residential purposes and that the ordinance area only includes about 3 square miles, is sparsely settled and contains large tracts of unoccupied land. P claims that the ordinance was written only to suppress P’s business and that of another brick maker. P also alleged that there were other brick makers in other parts of the city in built-up neighborhoods that were not regulated by the ordinance. P also introduced an affidavit in the form of a petition by the residents near the other permitted brickyards claiming them to be a nuisance, but the City has done nothing about them. P claimed that the ordinance does not state a public offense and is in violation of the State and Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. P claimed that the ordinance discriminates against him. D denied the charges that the ordinance was arbitrary and directed at P and alleged that another district had a similar ordinance. D denied that P conducted his operation in a sanitary way and presented affidavits to support this contention. There was no denial regarding the property values and that P's bricks could not be manufactured elsewhere. The California Supreme Court upheld the ordinance as a valid, nondiscriminatory regulatory measure and such regulations are not precluded simply because of the effect it has on business or land value. The court ruled that the district had become substantially residential and thus the ordinance was not arbitrary. The court rejected the contention that P was discriminated against or that the ordinance was arbitrary. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.