Gottfried v. Medical Planning Services, Inc.

142 F.3d 326 (6th Cir. 1998)

Facts

The Court of Common Pleas in Summit County, Ohio entered a permanent injunction on August 7, 1986. That injunction applies to the named and unnamed defendants, those acting in concert with them, and all other persons who have notice of the injunction. It prohibits anyone from picketing at Dr. Lal's home and his OB/GYN office; it protects the doorways and driveways at Dr. Lal's clinic; it forbids 'mass picketing or any other type of picketing . . . which directly or indirectly interferes' with the business of the clinic; and it prevents more than four people from picketing on each of the sidewalks in front of and alongside the clinic. Because the parties consented to this injunction, it was not appealed. P was not a party to the state lawsuit supporting the injunction. She was only ten years old when it was entered. P wants to picket and distribute information at Dr. Lal's home, office, and clinic, but she fears she will be arrested if she does. P filed this suit in federal court against Dr. Lal, his office, his clinic, the City of Akron, Akron Police Chief Larry Givens, Summit County, Summit County Sheriff Richard Warren, and Judge Jane Bond, the successor to Judge Winter on the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Gottfried asserted violations of her constitutional rights of free speech, free press, peaceful assembly, association, free exercise of religion, due process, and equal protection under the United States and Ohio Constitutions. She asked the District Court to declare the injunction unconstitutional on its face or as applied and to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the challenged portions of the injunction against her. She also requested $200,000 in damages in addition to her costs and attorney's fees. The court determined that the Anti-Injunction Act, Colorado River abstention, and Rooker-Feldman did not bar Gottfried's federal suit. Nonetheless, the court dismissed her case, reasoning that 'if a non-party to a consent decree has standing to challenge a state court consent decree in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, then actions in state court which are concluded by the entry of a consent decree will be of scant value, and the concepts of comity between the federal and state courts will suffer.' After a rehearing on post-judgment relief, the court again dismissed the case 'in the interest of state-federal comity' without ruling on the constitutionality of the injunction. P appealed.