Ps are fourteen individuals from five Massachusetts counties. They all live in committed same sex relationships. P includes business executives, lawyers, an investment banker, educators, therapists, and a computer engineer. Many are active in church, community, and school groups. They have employed such legal means as are available to them -- for example, joint adoption, powers of attorney, and joint ownership of real property -- to secure aspects of their relationships. Ps attests a desire to marry his or her partner in order to affirm publicly their commitment to each other and to secure the legal protections and benefits afforded to married couples and their children. D is charged by statute with safeguarding public health and 'enforces all laws' relative to the issuance of marriage licenses and the keeping of marriage records, and promulgates policies and procedures for the issuance of marriage licenses by city and town clerks and registers. P attempted to obtain a marriage license from a city or town clerk's office. The clerk either refused to accept the notice of intention to marry or denied a marriage license to the couple on the ground that Massachusetts does not recognize same-sex marriage. Ps filed suit in the Superior Court against D seeking a judgment that 'the exclusion of the plaintiff couples and other qualified same-sex couples from access to marriage licenses, and the legal and social status of civil marriage, as well as the protections, benefits, and obligations of marriage, violates Massachusetts law.' The court dismissed Ps' claim that the marriage statutes should be construed to permit marriage between persons of the same sex, holding that the plain wording of G. L. c. 207, as well as the wording of other marriage statutes, precluded that interpretation. The court held that the marriage exclusion does not offend the liberty, freedom, equality, or due process provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution and that the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights does not guarantee 'the fundamental right to marry a person of the same sex.' The court concluded that prohibiting same-sex marriage rationally furthers the Legislature's legitimate interest in safeguarding the 'primary purpose' of marriage, 'procreation.' Direct appellate review was granted.