D retained P to perform certain consulting services. P located an investment company that agreed to purchase all of D's outstanding shares, and between February 1988 and August 1989, P additionally advised D regarding corporate planning. On November 6, 1989, P demanded payment of over nine million dollars for services rendered, which D refused the following week. On November 9, 1995, P commenced an action to recover its commissions and fees. Because both parties were Delaware corporations, the court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Three months later, P brought a substantially similar suit across the street, in the Supreme Court, New York County. The parties do not dispute that this action is timely if the Federal action was timely when commenced on November 9, 1995. D sought dismissal of P's claims for failure to comply with the Statute of Limitations of Delaware (where plaintiff is incorporated) or Pennsylvania (where, according to the Federal complaint, P had its principal place of business). P's claims would be time-barred in both States. P maintained that New York's six-year statute of limitations applied because most of the events relating to the contract took place in New York and that the action was timely because the Federal action was commenced within six years after D refused P's demand for fees and commissions. The court dismissed the complaint, holding that under the borrowing statute P's causes of action accrued where it suffered injury: its place of residence. P appealed and the appeals court affirmed. P appealed.