Gibson v. Arnold

288 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2002)

Facts

P filed a complaint against D alleging that D had converted several thousand head of cattle which P owned. P sought damages in excess of two million dollars. A settlement conference was held. At the settlement conference, P and D informed the magistrate judge that they had agreed to settle all of P's claims, and the terms of the settlement were agreed to before the magistrate judge. Although the terms of the settlement were not entered on the record, it is undisputed that P and D agreed to settle the conversion case on the following terms. D agreed to confess a judgment in the amount of $ 400,000.00, and that the judgment would be non-dischargeable in bankruptcy. D also agreed to convey 640 acres of certain specified land to P, subject to one-half of the mortgage that existed on the property in favor of The Baptist Foundation of Oklahoma (Foundation), with P agreeing to pay off one-half of the balance of the mortgage. P and D agreed to execute a written settlement agreement. P's counsel subsequently prepared a written settlement agreement, a journal entry of judgment, a lease agreement, and a warranty deed, and he forwarded the settlement documentation to D's counsel for his approval. The district court entered an administrative closing order in which it stated that the parties had represented to the court that they had reached a settlement; and that the case was administratively terminated and would be deemed dismissed with prejudice unless reopened within thirty days. Neither party moved to reopen the case within the thirty-day period, and the conversion case was deemed dismissed with prejudice on July 25, 1999. The parties continued to finalize the settlement documentation, and several drafts and other correspondence were exchanged. D refused to execute the settlement documents. P filed a motion in the conversion case to enforce the settlement agreement. The district court denied P's motion, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement because the case had been dismissed. P filed the instant case in the same court as a separate action for breach of contract to specifically enforce the parties' oral settlement agreement and/or recover compensatory damages. D moved for summary judgment arguing that the oral settlement agreement was invalid under Oklahoma's statute of frauds, because it involved a transfer of real property, a lease of real property for more than a year, and monetary payments that were not to be performed within a year. The district court denied D's motion and conducted a bench trial on estoppel issues. D admitted in his sworn testimony that he had agreed at the settlement conference in the conversion case to settle the case in accordance with the terms set forth. He admitted that the parties had confirmed the terms of the settlement agreement before the magistrate judge. The district court concluded that D was not estopped under Oklahoma law from raising the statute of frauds, and the court therefore determined that the oral settlement agreement was invalid. P appealed.