Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.

418 U.S. 323 (1974)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

Welch (D) published 'American Opinion,' a John Birch Society newsletter. D printed an article about Gertz (P) that was untrue, discrediting P's reputation and motives in representing a policeman convicted of murder in the civil trials that followed the criminal conviction. D’s article said that P was part of a frame-up of the officer and that P was a Communist-fronter and that P had a criminal record. Petitioner filed a diversity action for libel claiming that the falsehoods published by respondent injured his reputation as a lawyer. Respondent moved to dismiss on the ground that petitioner failed to allege special damages. The court ruled that statements constituted libel per se under Illinois law, and that petitioner need not plead special damages. After answering the complaint, respondent filed a pretrial motion for summary judgment, claiming a constitutional privilege against liability for defamation. It asserted that petitioner was a public official or a public figure and that the article concerned an issue of public interest and concern and thus New York Times Co. v. Sullivan applied. The District Court denied the motion for summary judgment and concluded that petitioner might overcome the constitutional privilege by making a factual showing sufficient to prove publication of defamatory falsehood in reckless disregard of the truth. During the course of the trial, it became clear that the trial court had not accepted all of respondent's asserted grounds for applying the New York Times rule to the case. It thought that respondent's claim to the protection of the constitutional privilege depended on the contention that petitioner was either a public official under the New York Times or a public figure under Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts discounting the argument that a privilege would arise from the presence of a public issue. The court ruled that petitioner was neither a public official nor a public figure. It added that, if he were, the resulting application of the New York Times standard would require a directed verdict for respondent. Because some statements in the article constituted libel per se under Illinois law, the court submitted the case to the jury under instructions that withdrew from its consideration all issues save the measure of damages. The jury awarded $50,000 to petitioner. Following the jury verdict, the District Court concluded that the New York Times standard should govern the case even though petitioner was not a public official or public figure. It accepted respondent's contention that that privilege protected discussion of any public issue without regard to the status of a person defamed therein. Accordingly, the court entered judgment for respondent notwithstanding the jury's verdict. The Court of Appeals read Rosenbloom to require application of the New York Times standard to any publication or broadcast about an issue of significant public interest, without regard to the position, fame, or anonymity of the person defamed, and it concluded that respondent's statements concerned such an issue. There was no evidence that the managing editor of American Opinion knew of the falsity of the accusations made in the article. He knew nothing about petitioner except what he learned from the article. It held that mere proof of failure to investigate, without more, cannot establish reckless disregard for the truth; a publisher must act with a '`high degree of awareness of probable falsity.'' P appealed.