This case involves court-ordered desegregation for the DeKalb County School System (DCSS). DCSS has been subject to the supervision and jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia since 1969 when it was ordered to dismantle its dual school system. Within two months of Green v. School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968), Ps, who are black schoolchildren and their parents, instituted this class action. After the suit was filed, DCSS voluntarily began to devise a comprehensive and final plan of desegregation. The District Court, in June 1969, entered a consent order approving the proposed plan, which was to be implemented in the 1969-1970 school year. The order abolished the freedom of choice plan and adopted a neighborhood school attendance plan that had been proposed by DCSS and accepted by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare subject to a minor modification. Under the plan, all of the former de jure black schools were closed, and their students were reassigned among the remaining neighborhood schools. The District Court retained jurisdiction. In 1986, D filed a motion for final dismissal. D sought a declaration that DCSS had satisfied its duty to eliminate the dual education system, that is to say, a declaration that the school system had achieved unitary status. The District Court found DCSS to be 'an innovative school system that has traveled the often long road to unitary status almost to its end.' The court made findings that it was impressed with the successes of the DCSS and its dedication to providing a quality education for all students within that system.' It found that DCSS is a unitary system with regard to student assignments, transportation, physical facilities, and extracurricular activities, and ruled that it would order no further relief in those areas. It found that DCSS was not unitary in every respect. The court said that vestiges of the dual system remain in the areas of teacher and principal assignments, resource allocation, and quality of education. DCSS was ordered to take measures to address the remaining problems. In determining whether DCSS has achieved unitary status with respect to student assignment, the District Court saw its task as one of deciding if Ds 'have accomplished maximum practical desegregation of the DCSS or if the DCSS must still do more to fulfill their affirmative constitutional duty.' In accordance with its factfinding, the District Court held that it would order no further relief in the areas of student assignment, transportation, physical facilities, and extracurricular activities. The District Court, however, did order DCSS to establish a system to balance teacher and principal assignments and to equalize per-pupil expenditures throughout DCSS. Having found that blacks were represented on the school board and throughout DCSS administration, the District Court abolished the biracial committee as no longer necessary. Both parties appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's ultimate conclusion that DCSS has not yet achieved unitary status but reversed the District Court's ruling that DCSS has no further duties in the area of student assignment. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred by considering the six Green factors as separate categories. It rejected the incremental approach. D appealed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.