Frantz v. U.S. Powerlifting Federation

836 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1987)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

The complaint charged the International Powerlifting Federation (IPF), its American affiliate the United States Powerlifting Federation (USPF), and Conrad Cotter, the president of the USPF, with conspiring to monopolize the sport of weight lifting. Ps were two weight lifters who were disqualified from participating in events sponsored by the IPF because they participated in events sponsored by the American Powerlifting Federation (APF). The APF is itself a plaintiff. Under the IPF's rules, participants in meets that are not sanctioned by the IPF or its national affiliates may not participate in the IPF's international championship meets. A default judgment was entered against IPF. The district court dismissed the complaint against the USPF and Cotter under Rule 12(b)(6) after Ps' counsel conceded that the complaint was insufficient. An amended complaint was filed against USPF, and it too was dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), finding it dependent on a theory of conspiracy between the USPF and the IPF that could not be sustained. Cotter was given attorneys' fees as a sanction under Rule 11 for the initial complaint against him, because the plaintiffs did not have a plausible argument about how the USPF could conspire with its officers. USPF's request for sanctions was denied because PS' amended complaint had a colorable, though unsuccessful, theory. Cotter's request for fees came to $44,700. The size of the request surprised -- shocked -- the district judge. The court vacated its award under Rule 11, writing: The law is clear that a corporate officer is not capable of conspiring with his corporation about antitrust violations. Sanctions were awarded because it was extremely clear to the court that there was no legal or factual basis for naming Cotter as a defendant. Cotter's attorneys, however, contend that they have spent at least 39.535 hours drafting that portion of the motion to dismiss, memorandum in support of the motion, and summary of the motion, which pertained to Cotter. They have requested $4,289.48 in fees as to this activity. (They also request an additional $40,401.40 in fees.) Apparently, the issues regarding Cotter's legal and factual involvement in the case were vastly more complicated than this court had determined. The issues must also have been more complicated than appeared from the briefs of the parties. Therefore, the court is sua sponte reconsidering the award of attorneys' fees under Rule and is hereby denying the award of attorneys' fees in toto. This appeal resulted.