Florida v. Nixon

543 U.S. 175 (2004)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

Bickner had been tied to a tree and set on fire while still alive. Her left leg and arm, and most of her hair and skin had been burned away. Police found Bickner's car, abandoned on a Tallahassee street corner, on fire. Police arrested 23-year-old Joe Elton Nixon (D) later that morning after D's brother informed the sheriff's office that D had confessed to the murder. D described in graphic detail how he had kidnapped Bickner, then killed her. D tied her to a tree with jumper cables. Bickner pleaded with D to release her, offering him money in exchange. Concerned that Bickner might identify him, D decided to kill her. He set fire to Bickner's personal belongings and ignited her with burning objects. D drove away and later told his brother and girlfriend what he had done. He burned the car after reading in the newspaper that Bickner's body had been discovered. There was overwhelming evidence establishing that D had committed the murder in the manner he described. D was indicted for first-degree murder, kidnapping, robbery, and arson. Assistant public defender Michael Corin, assigned to represent D, filed a plea of not guilty and deposed all of the State's potential witnesses. Corin concluded, given the strength of the evidence that D's guilt was not 'subject to any reasonable dispute.' He commenced plea negotiations, hoping to persuade the prosecution to drop the death penalty in exchange for D's guilty pleas to all charges. Corin feared that denying D's commission of the kidnapping and murder during the guilt phase would compromise Corin's ability to persuade the jury, during the penalty phase, that D's conduct was the product of his mental illness. Corin concluded that the best strategy would be to concede guilt, thereby preserving his credibility in urging leniency during the penalty phase. D was generally unresponsive during their discussions over the strategy. He never approved or protested Corin's proposed strategy. Corin eventually exercised his professional judgment to pursue the concession strategy because D did nothing. During trial, D turned disruptive and violent. He pulled off his clothing, demanded a black judge and lawyer, refused to be escorted into the courtroom, and threatened to force the guards to shoot him. D stated he had no interest in the trial and threatened to misbehave if forced to attend. The judge ruled that Nixon had intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to be present at trial. At trial, Corin acknowledged D's guilt and urged the jury to focus on the penalty phase. In his closing argument, Corin again conceded D's guilt and reminded the jury of the importance of the penalty phase. During the penalty phase, Corin presented his case. The jury recommended that D be sentenced to death. At the close of the penalty phase, the court commended Corin's performance during the trial, stating that 'the tactic employed by trial counsel ... was an excellent analysis of [the] reality of his case.' On appeal, new counsel argued that Corin had rendered ineffective assistance by conceding D's guilt without obtaining D's express consent and under Cronic should be presumed prejudicial because it left the prosecution's case unexposed to 'meaningful adversarial testing.' On a motion for post-conviction relief D renewed his Cronic-based 'presumption of prejudice' ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Corin's concession, according to the Florida Supreme Court, was the 'functional equivalent of a guilty plea' in that it allowed the prosecution's guilt-phase case to proceed essentially without opposition. The Florida Supreme Court stated a concession of guilt at trial requires a defendant's 'affirmative, explicit acceptance,' without which counsel's performance is presumptively inadequate. Eventually, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.