Fisher v. University Of Texas At Austin

133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

D considers race as one of various factors in its undergraduate admissions process. Race is not itself assigned a numerical value for each applicant, but D has committed itself to increasing racial minority enrollment on campus. It refers to this goal as a “critical mass.” P is Caucasian. P sued D after her application was rejected. She contends that D’s use of race in the admissions process violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. D has used three different programs to evaluate candidates for admission. The first is the program it used for some years before 1997 when the University considered two factors: a numerical score reflecting an applicant’s test scores and academic performance in high school (Academic Index or AI), and the applicant’s race. In 1996, this system was held unconstitutional by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. It ruled the D’s consideration of race violated the Equal Protection Clause because it did not further any compelling government interest. D then used a new holistic metric of a candidate’s potential contribution to the D, to be used in conjunction with the Academic Index. This “Personal Achievement Index” (PAI) measures a student’s leadership and work experience, awards, extracurricular activities, community service, and other special circumstances that give insight into a student’s background. These included growing up in a single-parent home, speaking a language other than English at home, significant family responsibilities assumed by the applicant and the general socio-economic condition of the student’s family. Seeking to address the decline in minority enrollment D also expanded its outreach programs. The Texas State Legislature enacted a measure known as the Top Ten Percent Law. The Top Ten Percent Law grants automatic admission to any public state college, including the University, to all students in the top 10% of their class at high schools in Texas that comply with certain standards. Under admissions that did not consider race, the entering class was 4.5% African-American and 16.9% Hispanic. This is in contrast with the 1996 pre-Hopwood and Top Ten Percent regime when race was explicitly considered, and D’s entering freshman class was 4.1% African-American and 14.5% Hispanic. Following Grutter and Gratz D adopted a third admissions program, where it reverted to explicit consideration of race. In Grutter, the Court upheld the use of race as one of many “plus factors” in an admissions program that considered the overall individual contribution of each candidate. In Gratz, by contrast, the Court held unconstitutional Michigan’s undergraduate admissions program, which automatically awarded points to applicants from certain racial minorities. D included a student’s race as a component of the PAI score, beginning with applicants in the fall of 2004. D asks students to classify themselves from among five predefined racial categories on the application. Race is not assigned an explicit numerical value, but it is undisputed that race is a meaningful factor. The scores are plotted on a grid with the Academic Index on the x-axis and the PAI on the y-axis. On that grid students are assigned to so-called cells based on their individual scores. All students in the cells falling above a certain line are admitted. All students below the line are not. Each college-such as liberal arts or engineering-admits students separately. So a student is considered initially for her first-choice college, then for her second choice, and finally for general admission as an undeclared major. P applied for admission for 2008 and was rejected. She alleged that D’s consideration of race in admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause. The District Court granted summary judgment to D. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. It held that Grutter required courts to give substantial deference to D, both in the definition of the compelling interest in diversity’s benefits and in deciding whether its specific plan was narrowly tailored to achieve its stated goal. Applying that standard, the court upheld D’s admissions plan. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.