Fisher v. Univ. Of Texas

133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

D considers race as one of various factors in its undergraduate admissions process. Race is not itself assigned a numerical value for each applicant, but D has committed itself to increasing racial minority enrollment on campus. It refers to this goal as a “critical mass.” P, who is Caucasian, sued D after her application was rejected. She contends that D’s use of race in the admissions process violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. P was 1 of 29,501 applicants. From this group, 12,843 were admitted, and 6,715 accepted and enrolled. P was denied admission. In 2004, after Grutter, D reverted to explicit consideration of race in its admission program. Grutter upheld the use of race as one of many “plus factors” in an admissions program that considered the overall individual contribution of each candidate. In Gratz, by contrast, the Court held unconstitutional Michigan’s undergraduate admissions program, which automatically awarded points to applicants from certain racial minorities. D included a student’s race as a component of the PAI score, beginning with applicants in the fall of 2004. The University asks students to classify themselves from among five predefined racial categories on the application. Race is not assigned an explicit numerical value, but it is undisputed that race is a meaningful factor. Once applications have been scored, they are plotted on a grid with the Academic Index on the x-axis and the Personal Achievement Index on the y-axis. On that grid students are assigned to so-called cells based on their individual scores. All students in the cells falling above a certain line are admitted. All students below the line are not. P sued alleged that D’s consideration of race in admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment to D. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that Grutter required courts to give substantial deference to D, both in the definition of the compelling interest in diversity’s benefits and in deciding whether its specific plan was narrowly tailored to achieve its stated goal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.