Felker v. Turpin

518 U.S. 651 (1996)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

On a night in 1976, Felker (D) approached Jane W. in his car as she got out of hers. Claiming to be lost and looking for a party nearby, he used a series of deceptions to induce Jane to accompany him to his trailer home in town. D then forcibly subdued her, raped her, and sodomized her. Jane pleaded with petitioner to let her go, but he said he could not because she would notify the police. She escaped later when D fell asleep. Jane notified the police, and petitioner was eventually convicted of aggravated sodomy and sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment. D was paroled four years later. On November 23, 1981, he met Joy Ludlam, a cocktail waitress at the lounge where she worked. She was interested in changing jobs, and petitioner used a series of deceptions involving offering her a job at 'The Leather Shoppe,' a business he owned, to induce her to visit him the next day. The last time Joy was seen alive was the evening of the next day. Her dead body was discovered two weeks later in a creek. Forensic analysis established that she had been beaten, raped, and sodomized and that she had been strangled to death before being left in the creek. A jury convicted D of murder, rape, aggravated sodomy, and false imprisonment. D was sentenced to death on the murder charge. Eventually D filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, alleging that (1) the State's evidence was insufficient to convict him; (2) the State withheld exculpatory evidence, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (3) petitioner's counsel rendered ineffective assistance at sentencing; (4) the State improperly used hypnosis to refresh a witness' memory; and (5) the State violated double jeopardy and collateral estoppel principles by using petitioner's crime against Jane W. as evidence at petitioner's trial for crimes against Joy Ludlam. The District Court denied the petition. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, 52 F.3d 907, extended on denial of petition for rehearing, 62 F.3d 342 (1995), and we denied certiorari, 516 U.S. 1133 (1996). With his death sentence nearing, on April 29, 1996, petitioner filed a second petition for state collateral relief. The state trial court denied this petition May 1, and the Georgia Supreme Court denied certiorari May 2. On April 24, 1996, the President signed the Act into law. Title I of this Act contained a series of amendments to existing federal habeas corpus law. The provisions of the Act pertinent to this case concern second or successive habeas corpus applications by state prisoners. Subsections 106(b)(1) and (b)(2) specify the conditions under which claims in second or successive applications must be dismissed, amending 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) to read: (1) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed. Subsection 106(b)(3) creates a 'gatekeeping' mechanism for the consideration of second or successive applications in district court. The prospective applicant must file in the court of appeals a motion for leave to file a second or successive habeas application in the district court. § 106(b)(3)(A). Thus, the grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or a writ of certiorari. On May 2, 1996, petitioner filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit a motion for stay of execution and a motion for leave to file a second or successive federal habeas corpus petition under § 2254. Petitioner sought to raise two claims in his second petition, the first being that the state trial court violated due process by equating guilt 'beyond a reasonable doubt' with 'moral certainty' of guilt in voir dire and jury instructions. The Court of Appeals denied both motions the day they were filed: they did not meet the standards of § 106(b)(2) of the Act, and that they would not have satisfied pre-Act standards for obtaining review on the merits of second or successive claims. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.