Estate Of Ellis

923 N.E.2d 237 (2009)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

Grace executed a will in 1964 designating her elderly parents as the primary beneficiaries of her estate, and designating her descendants and P as contingent beneficiaries. In 1999, she executed a new will naming James G. Bauman (D) as sole beneficiary and Grace’s surviving heirs at law as contingent beneficiaries of her estate. Bauman was the pastor of the church of which Grace was a member. When Grace died in 2003, the 1999 will was admitted to probate. She left no descendants. Her estate was worth more than $2 million dollars. The 1999 will was filed on October 9, 2003, and admitted to probate on October 29, 2003. D was named independent executor of the estate. P became aware of its interest when D filed the will with the circuit court in 2006 as part of a separate will contest brought by several of Grace's heirs at law. P filed its 'Petition to Contest Will and For Other Relief' on August 8, 2006. Grace met D in 1994 and became a member of St. John's Lutheran Church where D was a pastor. Grace gave D powers of attorney over her health care and property, changed title to more than $1 million of her assets to D, and purchased gifts and an automobile for D. P claimed undue influence and mental incapacity. P set forth a tort claim for intentional interference with an expectancy of inheritance. It alleged that: (1) but for the 1999 will obtained by D, P would have received the entire estate; (2) with knowledge of the 1964 will, D set forth on an intentional scheme to interfere with P's expectancy for his personal benefit; (3) D interfered with P's expectancy by abusing his position of trust, unduly influencing Grace to execute a new will and to buy him gifts, violating his fiduciary duty to Grace, taking advantage of her age and diminished capacity, and failing to notify beneficiaries and interested parties after her death; and (4) but for D's actions, the bequest to P would have been received. D filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the suit was filed more than six months after admission to probate of the 1999 will, in violation of section 8-1 of the Probate Act of 1975 to contest the validity of the will. The circuit court granted D's motion and denied P leave to amend. The appellate court affirmed. It held that the allegations in P's tort claim were virtually identical to those in its will contest count based on undue influence. The court concluded that the legislature could not have intended 'to bar a will contest as untimely after six months yet allow the same allegations to proceed in the tort arena.' Thus P's tort claim amounted to an impermissible collateral attack on the order admitting the 1999 will to probate and was properly dismissed as time-barred under section 8-1 of the Probate Act of 1975. P appealed.