Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Peabody Western Coal Company

610 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010)

Purchase the Printed Copy at bsmsphd.com

Nature of the Case

To access this section all you need to do is click here and register.

Facts

D mines coal on the Navajo and Hopi reservations. D does so pursuant to leases with the Navajo and Hopi tribes inherited from its predecessor-in-interest, Sentry Royalty Company (Sentry). Both leases require that D provide an employment preference to Navajo job applicants. The Department of the Interior (DOI) approved both mining leases, as well as subsequent amendments and extensions, under the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA). The DOI drafted the leases and required the inclusion of the Navajo employment preferences. If these terms are violated, both the Nation and the Secretary retain the power to cancel them after a notice and cure period. P filed this suit against D in June 2001, alleging that D was unlawfully discriminating on the basis of national origin by implementing the Navajo employment preferences. P alleged that such conduct violated Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), which prohibits employers from refusing to hire applicants because of their national origin. P's position throughout this litigation has been that the Indian preference exception of Title VII, § 2000e-2(i), permits discrimination in favor of Indians living on or near a particular tribe's reservation, but does not permit discrimination against Indians who live on or near that reservation but are members of another tribe. P seeks (1) an injunction prohibiting D from continuing to discriminate on the basis of national origin and requiring D to provide equal employment opportunities for non-Navajo Indians living on or near the Navajo reservation; (2) damages, including back pay with interest, compensatory damages, and punitive damages; and (3) an order requiring D to make and preserve records in compliance with Title VII. D moved to dismiss the action. D claims Rule 19 required dismissal because the Nation was a necessary and indispensable party to the action and, second, that the action presented a nonjusticiable political question between P and DOI because DOI had approved the mining leases. The court granted D's motion. P appealed. The appeals court reversed and held that the Nation was a necessary party under Rule 19, but that P's suit need not be dismissed because joinder of the Nation was feasible. The Nation could not assert sovereign immunity as a defense against joinder. P lacked statutory authority to state a cause of action against the Nation, but a joinder of the Nation for the purposes of res judicata was still possible and would be effective in providing 'complete relief between the parties.' P's claim did not present a nonjusticiable political question. The court remanded for further proceedings with the Nation joined under Rule 19. P filed an amended complaint that included the same claims and prayer for relief as its initial complaint. The Nation moved to dismiss under Rule 19, arguing, P's amended complaint impermissibly seeks affirmative relief against the Nation, and that the Secretary of the Interior is a necessary and indispensable party. The district court granted summary judgment against P, holding that (1) P was seeking affirmative relief against the Nation in its amended complaint, and that the Nation therefore could not be joined under Rule 19; and (2) the Secretary was a necessary and indispensable party for whom joinder was not feasible. P once again appealed.