P filed suit against Henry and Jack Effel in district court asserting various claims and seeking judicial foreclosure on two mechanic's liens. As part of the settlement, P purchased residential property in Dallas County owned by Henry and Jack. The settlement agreement stated that the current resident of the property, D, 'shall continue to occupy the property for the remainder of her natural life, or until such time as she voluntarily chooses to vacate the premises.' D was neither a party nor a signatory to the settlement agreement. The property was deeded to P with no reservation of a life estate. A lease was prepared with the term of the lease 'for a term equal to the remainder of the Lessee's life, or until such time that she voluntarily vacates the premises.' If there was any default in the payment of rent or in the performance of any of the covenants, the lease could be terminated at the option of the lessor. The lease was signed by P as lessor and by Henry Effel on behalf of D under a power of attorney as lessee. Three years later, P terminated the lease because D had installed a wrought iron fence in the front yard of the property in violation of two covenants of the lease. D did not vacate the property. P filed this forcible detainer action in the justice court. The justice court awarded possession of the property to P, and D appealed the decision to the county court at law. The county court awarded the property to P. The court concluded the lease created a tenancy at will terminable at any time by either party. D appealed.