Health care has always been a problem for coal miners and their families. This eventually led to the creation of benefit funds, financed by royalties on coal produced and payroll deductions. Eventually, it was concluded that the medical needs of miners and their dependents would be more effectively served through 'a broad prepayment system, based on sound actuarial principles.' Such systems were worked out with royalties on coal and wage deductions. The 1950 W&R Fund, was operated on a pay-as-you-go basis, maintaining a sound relationship between revenues and expenditures. No vested interest in the Fund extended to any beneficiary. The 1950 W&R Fund did not, by its terms, guarantee lifetime health benefits for retirees and their dependents. To comply with ERISA, the parties entered into the 1974 NBCWA, which created four trusts, funded by royalties on coal production and premiums based on hours worked by miners, to replace the 1950 W&R Fund. Miners who retired before January 1, 1976, and their dependents were covered by the 1950 Benefit Plan, while active miners and those who retired after 1975 were covered by the 1974 Benefit Plan. Under the 1974 NBCWA, the number of eligible benefit recipients jumped dramatically. This quickly resulted in financial problems for the 1950 and 1974 Benefit Plans. The 1978 NBCWA included a 'guarantee' clause obligating signatories to make sufficient contributions to maintain benefits during that agreement, and 'evergreen' clauses were incorporated into the Plans so that signatories would be required to contribute as long as they remained in the coal business, regardless whether they signed a subsequent agreement. Liability shifted from a defined contribution obligation, under which employers were responsible only for a predetermined amount of royalties, to a form of defined benefit obligation, under which employers were to fund specific benefits. The rising cost of participation lead more employers to withdraw from the plans, resulting in more onerous obligations for those that remained. A Commission suggested that Congress spread the cost of retirees' health benefits across 'a broadened base of current and past signatories to the contracts,' apparently referring to the 1978 and subsequent NBCWA's. Congress responded by passing the Coal Act. Those companies which employed the retirees in question, and thereby benefitted from their services, will be assigned responsibility for providing the health care benefits promised in their various collective bargaining agreements. Where a signatory is no longer involved in any business activity, premiums may be levied against 'related persons,' including successors in interest and businesses or corporations under common control. P was organized as a Massachusetts business trust in 1929. As a signatory to each NBCWA executed between 1947 and 1964, P made contributions of over $60 million to the 1947 and 1950 W&R Funds. In 1963, Eastern transferred its coal-related operations to a subsidiary, Eastern Associated Coal Corp. (EACC). EACC to assume all of P's liabilities arising out of coal mining and marketing operations in exchange for P's receipt of EACC's stock. P retained its stock interest in EACC through a subsidiary corporation, Coal Properties Corp. (CPC), until 1987, and it received dividends of more than $100 million from EACC during that period. P sold its interest in CPC to Peabody Holding Company, Inc. (Peabody). Under the Coal Act, the Commissioner assigned to P the obligation for Combined Fund premiums respecting over 1,000 retired miners who had worked for the company before 1966. P's premium for a 12-month period exceeded $5 million. P sued asserting that the Coal Act, either on its face or as applied, violates substantive due process and constitutes a taking of its property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Court granted summary judgment for Ds on all claims. The appeals court described the Coal Act as 'entitled to the most deferential level of judicial scrutiny,' explaining that, 'where, as here, a piece of legislation is purely economic and does not abridge fundamental rights, a challenger must show that the legislature acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.' It held that Congress' purpose in enacting the Coal Act was legitimate and P's obligations under the Act are rationally related to those objectives. The court analyzed the taking issue under the three factors set out in Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: '(1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, (2) the extent to which the regulation interferes with the claimant's reasonable investment-backed expectations, and (3) the nature of the governmental action.' It held that the Act merely 'adjusts the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.' They held that the premiums are disbursed to the privately operated Combined Fund, not to a government entity. For those reasons, the court concluded, 'there is no basis whatever for P’s claim that the [Coal Act] transgresses the Takings Clause.' The Supreme Court granted certiorari.