Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.

422 U.S. 922 (1975)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

D along with other local law enforcement officials, was preliminarily enjoined by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York from enforcing a local ordinance of the town of North Hempstead. Ps are three corporations which operate bars at various locations within the town. Prior to enactment of the ordinance in question, each provided topless dancing as entertainment for its customers. On July 17, 1973, the town enacted Local Law No. 1-1973, an ordinance making it unlawful for bar owners and others to permit waitresses, barmaids, and entertainers to appear in their establishments with breasts uncovered or so thinly draped as to appear uncovered. P complied with the ordinance by clothing their dancers in bikini tops and brought this action in the District Court under 42 U.S.C. 1983. They alleged that the ordinance violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Their pleadings sought a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and declaratory relief. The prayer for a temporary restraining order was denied, but the motion for a preliminary injunction was set for a hearing on August 22, 1973. The day after the TRO was denied, one of them, M & L Restaurant, Inc., resumed its suspended presentation of topless dancing. On that day, and each of the three succeeding days, M & L and its topless dancers were served with criminal summonses based on violation of the ordinance. The other two appellees, Salem Inn, Inc., and Tim-Rob Bar, Inc., did not resume the presentation of topless entertainment in their bars until after the District Court issued its preliminary injunction. The District Court entered an opinion and order in which it enjoined D 'pending the final determination of this action . . . from prosecuting the plaintiffs for any violation of Local Law No. 1-1973 . . . or in any way interfering with their activities which may be prohibited by the text of said Local Law.' The court did address D's Younger contention but held that the pending prosecution against M & L did not affect the availability of injunctive relief to Salem and Tim-Rob. As for M & L, it concluded that if federal relief were granted to two of the appellees, 'it would be anomalous' not to extend it to M & L as well. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. As for M & L, the court thought that it posed 'a slightly different problem,' since the state prosecution was begun only one day after the filing of appellees' complaint in the District Court. The court recognized that this situation was not squarely covered by either Younger or Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), but concluded that the interests of avoiding contradictory outcomes, of conservation of judicial energy, and of a clearcut method for determining when federal courts should defer to state prosecutions, all militated in favor of granting relief to all three appellees.