Dohrmann v. Swaney

14 N.E.3d 605 (2014)

Facts

P met Mrs. Rogers in 1984. They lived in the same building. Mrs. Rogers was a 73-year-old widow. She had never had nor adopted any children. P was a 40-year-old neurosurgeon, married to Dr. Helen Dohrmann. Mrs. Rogers initially enjoyed P's attention, but then became concerned that he was befriending her in order to get her property upon her death. In 1998, P approached her about adult adoption, suggesting that one of them adopt the other. P consulted with an attorney, and upon learning that residency is a prerequisite for adult adoption, P entered into a written lease for an apartment in Arkansas. Mrs. Rogers never submitted a signed letter of engagement, and P never adopted Mrs. Rogers, nor was he ever adopted by Mrs. Rogers. P then prepared a written contract. Mrs. Rogers, who was 89 years old at the time, signed the contract. There were no witnesses present at the signing. Mrs. Rogers did not consult with her long-time lawyer and who did not learn of the contract until just prior to the initiation of the instant lawsuit. The contract is for past and future services and other good and valuable consideration, and in naming his children after Rogers, Mrs. Rogers was to give her apartment and other property worth $4 million to P upon her death. Mrs. Rogers was to have her will reflect the contract and if not P was to have a valid claim against her estate for such amount. Two months later, on June 22, 2000, P's two sons' names were legally changed to include 'Rogers' as one of their middle names. Mrs. Rogers' estate plan consisted of bequests to various friends and distant relatives aggregating several million dollars, with the remainder of the estate distributable to seven Chicago-based charities and Mrs. Rogers' alma mater. P was not in the plan. Three years later, P was declared a disabled person without capacity to manage her estate or financial affairs. Mr. Swaney was appointed as the guardian of her estate. P sued in 2007 and D argued the contract should be set aside because the consideration was grossly inadequate as to shock the conscious along with circumstances of unfairness, and the contract is unconscionable. The court ruled the contract unenforceable, and P appealed.