Doe v. Bolton

Facts

Georgia (D) passed a statute that made criminal abortion legal if it was performed by a physician duly licensed' in Georgia when, 'based upon his best clinical judgment . . . an abortion is necessary because: '(1) A continuation of the pregnancy would endanger the life of the pregnant woman or would seriously and permanently injure her health; or '(2) The fetus would very likely be born with a grave, permanent, and irremediable mental or physical defect; or '(3) The pregnancy resulted from forcible or statutory rape.' Also for an abortion to be authorized or performed as a noncriminal procedure, additional conditions must be fulfilled. These are (1) and (2) residence of the woman in Georgia; (3) reduction to writing of the performing physician's medical judgment that an abortion is justified for one or more of the reasons specified by 26-1202 (a), with written concurrence in that judgment by at least two other Georgia-licensed physicians, based upon their separate personal medical examinations of the woman; (4) performance of the abortion in a hospital licensed by the State Board of Health and also accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals; (5) advance approval by an abortion committee of not less than three members of the hospital's staff; (6) certifications in a rape situation; and (7), (8), and (9) maintenance and confidentiality of records. There is a provision (subsection (c)) for judicial determination of the legality of a proposed abortion on petition of the judicial circuit law officer or of a close relative, as therein defined, of the unborn child, and for expeditious hearing of that petition. There is also a provision (subsection (e)) giving a hospital the right not to admit an abortion patient and giving any physician and any hospital employee or staff member the right, on moral or religious grounds, not to participate in the procedure. Doe (P) other individuals (nine described as Georgia-licensed physicians, seven as nurses registered in the State, five as clergymen, and two as social workers), and two nonprofit Georgia corporations that advocate abortion took this declaratory and injunctive relief action against Ds. Ps sought a declaratory judgment that the Georgia abortion statutes were unconstitutional in their entirety. They also sought injunctive relief restraining the defendants and their successors from enforcing the statutes. Mary Doe (P) was a 22-year-old Georgia citizen, married, and nine weeks pregnant. She had three living children. The two older ones had been placed in a foster home because of Doe's poverty and inability to care for them. The youngest, born July 19, 1969, had been placed for adoption. Her husband had recently abandoned her, and she was forced to live with her indigent parents and their eight children. P applied to the Abortion Committee of Grady Memorial Hospital, Atlanta, for a therapeutic abortion under 26-1202. Her application was denied. P contends she was forced either to relinquish 'her right to decide when and how many children she will bear' or to seek an abortion that was illegal under the Georgia statutes. This invaded her rights of privacy and liberty in matters related to family, marriage, and sex, and deprived her of the right to choose whether to bear children. This was a violation of rights guaranteed her by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The statutes also denied her equal protection and procedural due process and, because they were unconstitutionally vague, deterred hospitals and doctors from performing abortions. P sued 'on her own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated.' The other plaintiffs alleged that the Georgia statutes 'chilled and deterred' them from practicing their respective professions and deprived them of rights guaranteed by the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. These plaintiffs also purported to sue on their own behalf and on behalf of others similarly situated. The District Court held that all the plaintiffs had standing but that only Doe presented a justiciable controversy. The court held that limiting legal abortions to the three situations was improper and declaratory relief was granted accordingly. It denied the request for injunctive relief: D's interest in protection of health, and the existence of a 'potential of independent human existence' justified state regulation of 'the manner of performance as well as the quality of the final decision to abort.' Ps took a direct appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1253.

Issues

Rule of Law

Holding and Decision

Legal Analysis

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