Dennis v. State

105 Md. App. 687 (1995)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

D and Robin met while they were teenagers; they began to live together and married when Robin became pregnant. D worked hard to support his family, and all, apparently, went well until late 1990 or early 1991, when they began to suffer financial difficulties due to Robin's spending habits. In July 1993, D and Robin declared bankruptcy. On June 26, 1993, Robin left the marital home, telling D that she was going to live with a female friend. About a week later, Robin confessed that she was, in fact, living with Bantz. D became upset in part because he knew that Bantz was 'involved with drugs.' D learned, in mid-July, that Robin too had begun smoking cocaine. She rejected his pleas to come home, 'because of the drugs and the sex.' D made two threats against Bantz -- one in a conversation with Bantz's parents and one in a letter he wrote to Robin. By late July or early August, D calmed down realizing that she wasn't going to come home. D focused his attention on [raising his son. On Tuesday, August 17, Robin told D that she wanted to return. The next day, Dt picked her up from work, took her to Bantz's house to get some of her belongings, and had dinner and spent the night with her. Robin changed her mind and asked for a little more time to make up her mind. She said that Bantz had moved back with his parents and allowed her to remain in the home they had shared until she could decide what she wanted to do. On Friday evening the 20th, at Robin's request, D allowed his son to stay with Robin. When D took his son to the house, Bantz was not there. On Saturday, D learned from his son that Bantz had come to the house on Friday evening, and that, as they were watching television, Bantz smoked cocaine. D called but got no answer. D drove to Bantz's house. He had with him in the car a .22 caliber handgun, allegedly because of a hunting trip planned for the next day. D stopped on the way and called Robin again, this time getting through to her; stating that she was going out with a girlfriend, she asked him to stay away, but he told her he was coming. D saw Bantz's father's truck. D approached the house, opened the screen door, and looked through the window. D stated, 'I seen [Bantz] standing there, and he had his hands around my wife, and they were kind of, like embraced in, I don't know, some kind of mood, I guess. He had her dress all hiked up around her. I could see her, you know. It was kind of hard to take. She was -- it was, like, her back and [Bantz's] belly. He had her kind of around in front of him, and the best way I can say it, he had her all hooked up. He had her dress kind of hiked up around her and it just looked like he was maybe feeling her private parts or so. It looked like they were getting ready to engage in some kind of sex act.' D claimed to have no memory of what happened. Police officers who responded to the scene in response to emergency calls from Robin saw that the front door had been kicked in and that the nine bullets fired into Bantz's head and body had been fired from at least 18 inches away; they were not contact wounds. D was indicted for first-degree murder. D requested a voluntary manslaughter instruction. That instruction states that a killing in hot-blooded response to 'legally adequate provocation' is a mitigating circumstance, that in order for such a mitigating circumstance to exist in the particular case, five factors must be present: (1) the defendant reacted to something in 'a hot-blooded rage'; (2) the rage was caused by something 'the law recognizes as legally adequate provocation' and that the only act the jury could find to be adequate provocation under the evidence, in this case, is 'the sudden discovery of the defendant's spouse in an act of sexual intercourse'; (3) the defendant was still enraged when he killed the victim; (4) there was not enough time between the provocation and the killing for a reasonable person's rage to cool; and (5) the victim was the person who provoked the rage. D objected to element (2) and the court modified it to a sudden discovery. D asked for a further expansion to include the totality of the circumstances to include adultery and drug use. The court declined. The jury was further instructed during deliberation that, 'recent is a term which is imprecise, and its meaning is within your sound discretion' and 'intercourse is to be interpreted as having its usual and generally accepted meaning.' D was convicted of first-degree murder and appealed.