Nature of the Case
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Facts
In 1991, Cope conveyed to JD Minerals (Davis (D)) her mineral interests in ten vaguely described tracts in Harrison County, Texas. The conveyance was on a printed form with tiny text. The list of tracts was followed by this sentence: Grantor agrees to execute any supplemental instrument requested by Grantee for a more complete or accurate description of said land. It also contained a Mother Hubbard clause and a general granting clause: The 'Lands' subject to this deed also include all strips, gores, roadways, water bottoms, and other lands adjacent to or contiguous with the lands specifically described above and owned or claimed by Grantors. If the description above proves incorrect in any respect or does not include these adjacent or contiguous lands, Grantor shall, without additional consideration, execute, acknowledge, and deliver to Grant[ee], its successors, and assigns, such instruments as are useful or necessary to correct the description and evidence such correction in the appropriate public records. Grantor hereby conveys to Grantee all of the mineral, royalty, and overriding royalty interest owned by Grantor in Harrison County, whether or not the same is herein above correctly described. James Hammond Mills conveyed his mineral interests in two tracts, also in Harrison County, also to D. The conveyance was on an identical form with a similarly vague description of the tracts followed by the same provisions. In 2011, Cope and Mills, independently, deeded to P. a landman who had contacted them, the interests they had conveyed, respectively, to D in 1991. P sued D to quiet title to the mineral interests asserting that the property descriptions and general granting clause in the 1991 deeds were insufficient to satisfy the requirement of the Statute of Frauds that the property conveyed be identified with reasonable certainty. P also sued for conversion of the royalties and payments obtained from the mineral interests, adverse possession, fraud, and failure of consideration. D argued that the general granting clause was sufficient to pass title of all the grantors' mineral interests in Harrison County. The trial court granted D's motion. P appealed and argued that the general granting clause is ambiguous because it purports to convey all the grantor's interests in the county-a large amount of property-although located in the same paragraph as the Mother Hubbard clause, a catch-all for small, overlooked interests. D appealed.
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