Dart v. Dart

Facts

P and D were married in 1980 and lived in Okemos, Michigan until 1993 when they moved to England. They owned a large house in Okemos, situated on thirty-nine acres of land, valued at $1,500,000. The parties had two children. D is the son of the founder of Dart Container Corporation, one of the largest family-controlled businesses in the United States. D's earned income for the years 1992, 1993, and 1994, was $313,009, $563,917, and $281,548, respectively. Between 1990 and 1993, the family's annual expenditures ranged from $300,000 to $600,000. The move to England made possible a September 1993 transfer of several hundred million dollars to D from family trusts. In 1974, D's father established a trust for the benefit of D and his brother. For the transfer to occur, D had to renounce his United States citizenship and relocate outside the United States. P refused to renounce her United States citizenship, and she also refused to renounce the citizenship of the children. P and D jointly purchased a house near London for £2.75 million. Renovations took over a year to complete and cost another £ 3.5 million. They enrolled the children in the American School of London. P and the children made regular trips to Michigan for holidays, medical care, vacations, haircuts, and other activities. P maintained her Michigan driver's license and voted regularly in Michigan elections. D received his distribution from the family trust which had a present, net value of £274 million (approximately $500,000,000). In the fall of 1994, P announced that she wanted a divorce. She revealed that what she had previously described to D as a 'one-night stand' in 1989 had actually been a regular, adulterous affair with a man in Greece. P asserts that she and D agreed to postpone the divorce action until she and the children returned to Michigan after the 1994-95 school year. D filed for divorce in England. P was served with process at the parties' home the following day. Her American attorneys filed a similar suit in Michigan. P and D remained in England until a consent order was entered in the English court on June 9, 1995, allowing P to return with the children to Michigan. D moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4) and (6) on the bases of lack of jurisdiction and pendency of a prior proceeding. The circuit court determined that jurisdiction was proper in Michigan and assumed jurisdiction over the children and the divorce proceeding. The court reserved for future decision the issue of jurisdiction over the parties' property. The English court ruled that jurisdiction was proper in England. D then asked the Ingham Circuit Court to defer jurisdiction to the English court on the basis of forum non conveniens. The circuit court denied the motion and assumed jurisdiction over the parties' property. Both suits proceeded. On October 27, 1995, a 'decree absolute' of divorce was entered in the English court. A seven-day trial was held in March 1996 in which P filed an answer claiming the 'full range of financial ancillary relief available to a wife under the Matrimonial Causes Act [of] 1973.' The English court issued a lengthy opinion in which it determined defendant's total net worth to be 'about £ 400 million.' P got £ 300,000 ($450,000) a year for life. The court awarded P a lump sum of £ 9 million ($13,500,000), the amount it felt necessary to achieve an equitable distribution. P got the house in Okemos, Michigan, and its contents, that the parties agreed were worth approximately $1.5 million. She was awarded four paintings and her jewelry. The court also set child support in the amount of $95,400 a year for both children. D was awarded four automobiles and the balance of the marital estate. The English court expressly found that P was not entitled to a substantial share of D's family wealth. It was not a product of the marriage and had not been generated by the efforts of either party. D moved to stay or dismiss the Ingham Circuit Court proceedings, arguing that the English judgment was entitled to enforcement under the principle of comity and under the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, MCL 691.1151 et seq.; MSA 27.955(1) et seq. The circuit court judge denied the motion, finding that the English judgment was not entitled to recognition under the UFMJRA or the principle of comity. The English system of law was repugnant to the public policy of Michigan, and the English decision violated plaintiff's 'right to have a fair and equitable distribution of property . . . .' The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the 'entire judgment, including the property division as well as the child support and lump-sum awards,' should be enforced under the UFMJRA. 224 Mich. App. 146, 150; 568 N.W.2d 353 (1997). P had not been denied due process. She was represented by counsel, given an opportunity to be heard, and presented evidence on her own behalf. There was no evidence that P was prejudiced by an unfair tribunal or proceeding is present. Comity mandated that the English judgment be respected. The Court of Appeals reasoned that res judicata barred the case from being relitigated because the English court had considered the property, alimony, and child support claims and issued a final order. P appealed.

Issues

Rule of Law

Holding and Decision

Legal Analysis

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