D’amario v. Ford Motor Co.

806 So.2d 424 (Fla. 2001)

Purchase the Printed Copy at bsmsphd.com

Nature of the Case

To access this section all you need to do is click here and register.

Facts

In D'Amario, Clifford Harris (P), a minor, was injured when the car in which he was riding as a passenger collided with a tree and then burst into flames. The car was driven by a friend of Harris who was allegedly intoxicated and speeding at the time of the accident. A witness to the crash circled the car twice and noticed a fire in the engine area. Some minutes later, the fire spread and an explosion occurred, engulfing the car in flames. P was severely injured, losing three limbs and suffering burns to much of his body. P alleged that a defective relay switch in the automobile caused the injuries. Ford (D) asserted as an affirmative defense that the injuries were proximately caused by the negligence of a third party. Ps moved to exclude evidence about the driver's alcohol consumption on the day of the accident, and the trial court ruled that evidence of the driver's alcohol consumption would be excluded. D moved to amend its affirmative defenses to include an allegation that Harris's injuries were caused by the fault of a third party, and proffered evidence of the driver's intoxication and excessive speed. The trial court granted D's request and held that an apportionment defense was available and evidence of the driver's actions in causing the initial accident could be admitted in support of such defense. The jury returned a verdict for the defense, finding that D was not a legal cause of the injuries to P. On a motion for a new trial, P asserted that the third party was not a legal cause of P's injuries, and that the court's ruling during trial further prejudiced P because it came after the jury was selected, hence depriving P of the right to question the venire panel about potential bias towards alcohol consumption and driving while intoxicated. The trial court granted P's motion for a new trial. The court ruled that it had erred in permitting evidence of the driver's alcohol content to go to the jury. D appealed, and the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that 'on the facts in this crash-worthiness case, D properly raised an apportionment defense.'

In Nash (P), P was driving to church with her two children in the back seat when an intoxicated driver crossed the center line and hit her car. P's head struck the metal post that separates the windshield from the driver's door. She later died as a result of her head injuries. Her two children survived. The driver of the other car was intoxicated and had a blood-alcohol content of .15 percent. P sued General Motors (D1) alleging a failure of the vehicle's seatbelt. P asked the trial court to exclude evidence of the other driver's intoxication. The trial court found that the jury 'had a right to know all the facts' concerning someone who appears on the verdict form. D got the verdict, and the trial court denied P's motion for a new trial. P appealed, and the court held that the evidence that Charles Chatfield, the other motorist, was intoxicated, was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial to the issue of whether D was negligent in designing a defective seatbelt. The Third District agreed, holding that it was error to permit the jury to apportion fault between an intentional tortfeasor and a negligent tortfeasor.