Daingerfield Island Protective Soc. v. Lujan

Facts

In exchange for the wetland property it acquired, D granted developer Charles Fairchild & Co. an easement to build an interchange on the George Washington Memorial Parkway ('Parkway'). Fairchild hoped that this interchange would one-day channel traffic to Potomac Greens, a mammoth office, hotel and residential complex he planned to build on land he leased from intervenor-appellee Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad Co. ('RF&P'). The Agreement for the transaction was signed. In May 1978, P sought to enjoin Ds from approving any interchange design. In its prayer for relief, P did not demand that the Agreement be set aside, nor, did it even allege that the 1970 Exchange Agreement was unlawful. P's suit looked as issues with respect to the interchange design. D had not yet acted on any proposed design, and the district court dismissed P's challenge, without prejudice, as premature. In April 1981, D approved the interchange design, reserving its right to make changes when Fairchild submitted more detailed plans. D's October 1983 Environmental Assessment concluded that the design was satisfactory, noting that because of the terms of the 1970 Exchange Agreement, D could not recommend a 'no build' alternative. The Commission of Fine Arts approved the design in April 1983, as did NCPC in November 1983. D issued a deed for the easement in August 1984. Prior to these approvals, in early 1982, RF&P had responded to Fairchild's delays by terminating his lease. The deed, therefore, went to RF&P as successor to Fairchild. In 1986, RF&P entered a joint venture with developer Savage/Fogarty Companies, Inc. and announced the joint venture's plans to build a somewhat smaller Potomac Greens complex. P filed this action alleging that when D approved the 1970 land exchange, the Service violated NEPA (Count I), the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act (Count II), the Mount Vernon Highway Act and the Capper-Cramton Act (Count III), the National Park Service Organic Act (Count IV), the National Capital Planning Act (Count V), the Administrative Procedure Act ('APA') (Count VI), and the National Historic Preservation Act (Count IX). Ds moved for dismissal or summary judgment. Congress was feeling left out and directed D to prepare, within eighteen months, an Environmental Impact Statement ('EIS') concerning the effect that Potomac Greens would have on traffic and on 'the visual, recreational and historical integrity of the Parkway.' The EIS was to evaluate 'alternative acquisition strategies,' including but not limited to the possibilities of acquiring RF&P's access rights, the portion of its 38-acre parcel lying within the Alexandria historical district, or the entire parcel. Congress further instructed NPS to investigate any other reasonable means by which the Parkway could be preserved. No construction permit for the interchange was to issue until the completed EIS had been reviewed by the 'appropriate' congressional committees for 60 days. D was to be sole judge of 'the legal and factual sufficiency of the [EIS] and its compliance with [NEPA].' Finally, Congress provided: The [EIS] shall be separate from, independent of, and in no way intended to affect or modify any pending litigation. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to consider questions respecting the factual and legal sufficiency of the [EIS] under [NEPA]. P moved to stay consideration of its NEPA claim until the EIS issued. The district court denied that motion and granted Ds' motion for summary judgment, holding that all challenges to the 1981 and 1983 approvals of the interchange design were mooted by the CAA and that all challenges to the 1970 Exchange Agreement were barred by laches.

Issues

Rule of Law

Holding and Decision

Legal Analysis

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