Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn

420 U.S. 469 (1975)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

Cohn's (P) daughter was victim of a murder-rape. The state of Georgia does not allow anyone to publicize a rape victim's name. A reporter for the Cox (D) obtained P's daughter's name by examining public records and identified her in a broadcast reporting on the crime. P sued D for invasion of privacy. Appellants admitted the broadcasts but claimed that they were privileged under both state law and the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court, rejecting appellants' constitutional claims and holding that the Georgia statute gave a civil remedy to those injured by its violation, granted summary judgment to appellee as to liability, with the determination of damages to await trial by jury. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the trial court had erred in construing 26-9901 to extend a civil cause of action for invasion of privacy, and thus found it unnecessary to consider the constitutionality of the statute. The court held the complaint stated a cause of action 'for the invasion of the appellee's right of privacy, or the tort of public disclosure' -- a 'common law tort exist[ing] in this jurisdiction without the help of the statute that the trial judge, in this case, relied on.' Although the privacy invaded was not that of the deceased victim, the father was held to have stated a claim for invasion of his own privacy by reason of the publication of his daughter's name. Even so, summary judgment was improper; whether the public disclosure of the name actually invaded appellee's 'zone of privacy,' and if so, to what extent, were issues to be determined by the trier of fact. It then held that it is reasonable to require the appellee to prove that the appellants invaded his privacy with willful or negligent disregard for the fact that reasonable men would find the invasion highly offensive. On rehearing, the court countered the argument that the victim's name was a matter of public interest, and could be published with impunity by relying on § 26-9901 as an authoritative declaration of state policy that the name of a rape victim was not a matter of public concern. It sustained the statute as a 'legitimate limitation on the right of freedom of expression contained in the First Amendment.'