Correctional Services Corporation (D), operates Community Corrections Centers and other facilities that house federal prisoners and detainees. D operates a halfway house located in New York City. Malesko (P) is a former federal inmate who was diagnosed with a heart condition and treated with prescription medication. P's condition limited his ability to engage in physical activity, such as climbing stairs. P was transferred to the halfway house to serve the remainder of his sentence. P lived on the fifth floor. D instituted a policy requiring inmates residing below the sixth floor to use the staircase rather than the elevator to travel from the first-floor lobby to their rooms. P was exempted from this policy on account of his heart condition. On March 28, 1994, an employee of D, forbade him to use the elevator to reach his fifth-floor bedroom. P protested that he was specially permitted elevator access but to no avail. P then climbed the stairs, suffered a heart attack, and fell, injuring his left ear. Three years later, P filed a pro se action against D in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Two years later, now acting with counsel, P filed an amended complaint which named the employee who forbade him use of the elevator as 1 of the 10 John Doe defendants. P alleged negligence and demanded judgment in the sum of $1 million in compensatory damages, $3 million in anticipated future damages, and punitive damages 'for such sum as the Court and/or jury may determine.' The District Court treated the amended complaint as raising claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents and dismissed P's cause of action in its entirety; A Bivens action may only be maintained against an individual,' and thus was not available against D, a corporate entity. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. That court affirmed dismissal of P's claims against individual defendants as barred by the statute of limitations. As for the Bivens application, the court reasoned that private entities like D should be held liable under Bivens to 'accomplish the ... important Bivens goal of providing a remedy for constitutional violations.' The Supreme Court granted certiorari.