The S. S. Karina was owned and operated by D and under time charter to Alcoa Steamship Co. (D). It was loaded at Mobile, Alabama, with palletized crates of cargo by Cooper. The vessel then proceeded to the Port of Houston where longshoremen employed by Mid-Gulf Stevedores, Inc., began to load sacked cargo. The longshoremen had to use the top of the tier of crates loaded by Cooper as a floor on which to walk and stow the Houston cargo. P injured his back when he stepped into a gap between the crates which had been concealed by a large piece of corrugated paper. P brought suit against Ds seeking to recover damages for his injuries. Ds filed a third-party complaint against Cooper alleging that if P was injured by any unseaworthy condition of the vessel or as the result of negligence other than his own, such condition or negligence resulted from the conduct of Cooper and its employees. Ds also filed a similar third-party complaint against Mid-Gulf. Mid-Gulf and Ds entered into an agreement under which Mid-Gulf would indemnify Ds against any recovery that P might obtain. Pursuant to this agreement, Mid-Gulf was dismissed as a third-party defendant and Mid-Gulf's attorneys were substituted as counsel for Ds. The court found that Ds' failure either to make adequate arrangements to assure that the stow would not move and leave spaces in the course of its trip from Mobile to Houston or to put some type of dunnage on top of the stow had resulted in an unsafe place to work and unseaworthy condition. Cooper was also found to be negligent in not stowing the crates in a manner in which longshoremen at subsequent ports could safely work on top of them. The District Court divided the liability equally between the Ds and Cooper. P recovered $38,679.90 from Ds and Ds recovered $19,339.95 from Cooper. Cooper appealed. It held that the apparent prohibition against contribution in noncollision maritime cases announced in Halcyon and Atlantic was inapplicable where the joint tortfeasor against whom contribution is sought is not immune from tort liability by statute. It held that because P could have proceeded directly against Cooper as the latter was not his employer and, therefore, not shielded by the limited liability of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, there was no reason why Ds couldn't do the same. Cooper appealed.