Nature of the Case
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Facts
D arrived at Velasquez's apartment. D was not expected and had not been invited to the apartment. Another friend of Velasquez arrived, and D stated that he was going to the bathroom and asked for a cigarette. He lit it with Velasquez's lighter. The cigarette was the only thing in D's hand as he left for the bathroom. The bathroom had a bottle of rubbing alcohol approximately six inches high and one-half to three-quarters full. The bottle had been in the bathroom at the time of D's visit three weeks earlier. Five minutes after D left the living room, Velasquez and his friend smelled smoke and saw flames. The smoke and fire prevented them from leaving by the front doorway. Vasquez broke a window in the baby's bedroom and escaped. Velasquez woke his sleeping child, handed her out the window to his friend, and climbed out himself. Capozzi saw D come out of number 174 and turn right onto Pearl Street, walking at a 'little faster' than normal pace. D disappeared from sight for approximately one minute and then reappeared, to a position in front of a garage, directly across from number 172-174. Three people perished due to asphyxia caused by smoke inhalation. A fireman, Captain James Trainor, entered the burning building in an attempt to rescue persons thought to be trapped inside, he was outfitted in standard firefighting gear: rubber coat, helmet, boots, and a self-contained breathing apparatus. While in the building Trainor collapsed; taken to a hospital and was pronounced dead on arrival. P's medical expert concluded that the combination of cold weather, stress, and smoke inhalation precipitated the coronary thrombosis which caused Trainor's death. Experts concluded that the fire was set and an accelerant was used to start the fire (presumably the rubbing alcohol), that the accelerant had to be ignited by an open flame, and that an accidentally dropped cigarette was insufficient to ignite the accelerant or to start the fire. D was charged with deliberately setting a fire in an apartment he was visiting. The judge instructed the jury that if D's act in any way contributed to hasten, or was part of the proximate cause of death, then D would be criminally liable. D was convicted of second-degree murder. D appealed his conviction, claiming that the instruction was incorrect.
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