Commonwealth v. Cary

623 S.E.2d 906 (2006)

Facts

D and Beekman were involved in a tumultuous relationship for more than 15 years during which time Beekman fathered three of D's four children. The two had cohabited in the past. They were not living together in 2002. They habitually argued violently regarding Beekman's failure to provide child support for his children. On May 23, 2002, D purchased a handgun 'to protect me and my children and our home' because she lived in a 'bad neighborhood.' In August 2002, D allegedly told Beekman's sister that she had purchased the handgun and threatened to kill Beekman because he continued to fail to provide child support. D allegedly made a similar statement to Tracy Tabron the day before Beekman was killed. D denied making these statements. On the evening of September 6, 2002, Beekman went to D's apartment. D detected alcohol on Beekman's person and knew from past experience that Beekman became violent when intoxicated. Beekman had a highly-elevated blood alcohol level and also that he had recently used cocaine. They began to quarrel over the failure to provide D with child support. Beekman grabbing D by the hair and hit her in the 'face and sides.' Beekman refused to leave the apartment despite d's request that he do so. Beekman went to use the bathroom and D decided to retrieve the handgun from where she kept it but found that Darron, her teenage son, had already done so. D took the handgun from Darron and removed its ammunition clip, intending to use the apparently unloaded weapon to frighten Beekman into leaving the apartment. Beekman again refused to leave the home and 'was still verbally assaulting' D, threatening that he would 'smack' her, ''F' [her] up,' and 'break [her] up.' As Beekman 'was getting ready to come into the living room,' D pointed the handgun at Beekman, and it discharged. The bullet struck Beekman in the chest. D could not 'remember doing anything [to make the handgun] go off' and 'believed it was on safety' and unloaded. D testified that she thought Beekman intended to resume his physical assault on her. D told all kinds of lies to the police. D ultimately admitted to police that she had shot Beekman, but maintained that she had only intended to frighten him into leaving the home and that the handgun had discharged accidentally. The handgun was never recovered. D was indicted for first-degree murder. D  sought to introduce evidence of Beekman's prior threats and acts of violence against her. P objected to the introduction of such evidence, contending that 'a defendant cannot introduce evidence of a victim's reputation for violence or evidence of specific facts of violence unless the defendant first adduces evidence of self-defense.' P contended that, when Beekman went to the bathroom, he had effectively ended his assault and did nothing afterward to place her in fear. D wanted to assert concurrent claims of accident and self-defense and that these claims were not mutually exclusive. The trial court ruled that Beekman's assault on D prior to the shooting was not an overt act sufficient to support a claim of self-defense, agreeing with P that when Beekman stopped the attack to go to the bathroom, D was no longer in imminent danger. The trial court ruled that D would not be entitled to present evidence of Beekman's prior threats and acts of violence against her and that she could not assert a defense of self-defense. Eventually, the trial court permitted d to proffer evidence of Beekman's prior threats and acts of violence against her. Beekman had raped Cary when they first met and that he had physically abused her and her children throughout their relationship. On one occasion, Beekman cut her face with a glass, allegedly resulting in '75 stitches,' and on another, he broke her jaw. Beekman was particularly prone to violence when he was intoxicated. The trial court refused instructions on the defenses of self-defense and heat of passion refused lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. D was found guilty. D appealed. The Court of Appeals held that D was entitled to a self-defense instruction because Beekman was ten feet away, and was advancing toward her in a threatening fashion to resume the attack he had stopped only moments earlier. P appealed.