D worked as an escort. Whiting telephoned the escort agency and requested an escort. The dispatcher told Whiting that he could receive a full body massage and one hour of an escort's company for $175. Whiting agreed to these terms, and arrangements were made for D to visit Whiting's home. D was dropped off there by a driver and the dispatcher's boyfriend (drivers). Whiting met her outside his building and accompanied her to his basement apartment. Whiting paid D, who then telephoned the agency to report that she had received payment. Whiting snorted two lines of cocaine. D then offered to begin a massage. Whiting replied that he wanted intercourse and believed that he had paid for it. D denied that she was sent to have intercourse with him, and telephoned the agency to inform them that Whiting wanted more than a massage. D handed the phone to Whiting, and the dispatcher reminded him of the original terms. Whiting demanded a total refund which was refused. The dispatcher told D to leave and agreed to stay on the line until D was out of the apartment. D testified that when she attempted to leave, Whiting pushed her onto his bed and retrieved a crowbar. D picked up a knife that was lying on the bedside table, next to a plate of cocaine. The dispatcher testified that while she was talking to Whiting, he said that D had a knife and that when D then got back on the telephone with her, D said that Whiting was picking up a crowbar. Whiting lammed the crowbar on a counter and then swung it at D, striking her in the leg. She nicked him in the face with the knife, drawing blood. D offered to begin again with a massage, but Whiting refused. The dispatcher alerted the drivers to return and D attempted to run toward the door, but Whiting tackled her. D stabbed Whiting in the shoulder with the knife and moved away. Whiting continued to block the exit, while D screamed at him to stay back and threatened to cut him again if he came any closer. The drivers returned to the scene, heard her screams, and kicked in the door to the apartment. The moment one of the drivers kicked in the door, Whiting advanced on her with the crowbar raised, at which point she stabbed him in the neck, inflicting a fatal wound. Whiting did not immediately drop the crowbar or move away from the door. When he eventually did, D fled the apartment with the drivers, throwing down the knife and her telephone. A driver testified that after the door was kicked open, Whiting turned to face the drivers, at which point he saw D move toward Whiting and stab him in the neck in a straightforward thrusting motion. The medical examiner's testimony concerning the likely manner in which the fatal knife wound was inflicted was not entirely consistent with the driver's testimony. D claimed self-defense. Whiting had cocaine in his bloodstream, and his blood alcohol level reflected his consumption of the equivalent of sixty ounces of beer or five ounces of whiskey. Neighbors testified that earlier that evening, Whiting appeared intoxicated and had made unsuccessful sexual advances toward women near the apartment building. D sought to cross-examine the neighbors about Whiting’s previous violent behavior and reputation for violence. The judge sustained the objections to these questions and also barred testimony about Whiting's behavior while intoxicated, ruling that Whiting's violent past or reputation for violence was only relevant if Adjutant had been aware of them at the time of the stabbing. The prosecution elicited testimony that Whiting was 'calm,' 'talked . . . very softly,' and 'sounded like a nice person' on the night of the incident. D moved for permission to 'impeach' this testimony by evidence of Whiting's prior acts of aggression. The judge denied the motion. D was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. The appeals court affirmed the conviction. D appealed.