C.M.G. is thirty-seven years old and in good health. She has a degree in Chemical Engineering and was in a Ph.D. program in biochemistry and molecular pharmacology. L.M.S. is forty-seven years old. L.M.S. has a degree as a veterinary technician. C.M.G. and L.M.S. were in a relationship for approximately five years when they began discussing having a child together. A.N.S. was born in February 2002 in Kazakhstan. L.M.S. adopted A.N.S. on March 12, 2003, and the parties returned with the child on March 23, 2003. the parties and A.N.S. resided together for the next year. The parties ended their relationship, and C.M.G. moved out of the residence in May 2004. By June 2004, L.M.S. prohibited contact between C.M.G. and A.N.S. C.M.G. filed a custody petition in June 2004, and the Court issued a temporary contact order. C.M.G. maintained regular contact with A.N.S. for the next four and one-half years. The January 2008 Order granted the parties joint custody with shared residency. C.M.G. has had very little contact with A.N.S. since March 9, 2009, when the Court dismissed the previous custody petition and vacated all orders subsequent to that petition, pursuant to the holding that the defacto parenting doctrine was not part of the law of the state. New laws were passed allowing de facto parentage. C.M.G. seeks for the Court to determine that she is A.N.S.'s de facto parent. She also seeks joint custody with shared residency of A.N.S. Three expert witnesses testified. L.M.S. argued that she did not consent to or foster C.M.G. forming a parent-like relationship with A.N.S. L.M.S. stated that any consideration she had of giving consent was 'all about intent.' According to L.M.S., after C.M.G.'s indiscretion with C.T. in December 2002, the parties had several discussions and made a verbal agreement that L.M.S. would give C.M.G. her consent to being A.N.S.'s parent only after C.M.G. met certain conditions. The conditions included that the parties' relationship would remain intact and C.M.G. would keep her promise to cease contact with C.T. L.M.S. maintains that C.M.G. did not meet either of those conditions and that she never gave C.M.G. her consent. L.M.S. testified that she believed she could give consent only if she did so in writing. L.M.S.'s 'intent to consent' explanation is countered by the parties' joint participation in the extensive and costly adoption process, journal entries written by L.M.S., and cards that L.M.S. gave C.M.G. either from herself or on A.N.S.'s behalf. The Court does not find that the parties ever had a verbal agreement that L.M.S. would provide her consent only after C.M.G. complied with certain conditions.