As part of a consolidated lawsuit, D sought a declaration that §301(l) of the Clean Water Act prohibited EPA from issuing 'fundamentally different factor' (FDF) variances for pollutants listed as toxic under the Act. The EPA developed its FDF variance as a mechanism for ensuring that its necessarily rough-hewn categories do not unfairly burden atypical plants. Any party may seek an FDF variance to make effluent limitations either more or less stringent if the standards applied to a given source, because of factors fundamentally different from those considered by EPA in setting the limitation, are either too lenient or too strict. The 1977 amendment provides: 'The Administrator may not modify any requirement of this section as it applies to any specific pollutant which is on the toxic pollutant list under section 307(a)(1) of this Act.' EPA continued its practice of occasionally granting FDF variances. It explicitly allowing FDF variances for pretreatment standards and BAT requirements. D challenged pretreatment standards for indirect dischargers and sought a declaration that § 301(l) barred any FDF variance with respect to toxic pollutants. P argued that the language did not prohibit granting FDF variances. P reasoned that “modifications” be read to apply to those modifications referred to in other provisions of §301 dealing with economic and water quality issues. The Fourth Circuit had rejected a similar argument, finding that § 301(l) was ambiguous on the issue of whether it applied to FDF variances and therefore deferring to the administrative agency's interpretation that such variances were permitted. The Third Circuit, in this case, ruled in favor of D holding that § 301(l) forbids the issuance of FDF variances for toxic pollutants. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.