Nature of the Case
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Facts
P was employed by D as a salaried superintendent engineer responsible for maintaining and up-dating the electronic and communications equipment on D's fleet of vessels, which consisted of six passenger cruise ships. Each ship in the fleet carried between 12 and 14 engineers who were assigned permanently to that vessel. P was one of two supervising engineers based in Miami. His duties ran to the entire fleet and included not only overseeing the vessels' engineering departments, which required him to take a number of voyages but also planning and directing ship maintenance from the shore. At trial, P claimed he spent 72 percent of his time at sea. His immediate supervisor testified that the appropriate figure was closer to 10 percent. P sailed for Bermuda aboard the S. S. Galileo to plan for an upcoming renovation. P developed a problem with his right eye on the day of departure, and he saw the ship's doctor as the Galileo left port. The doctor diagnosed a suspected detached retina but failed to follow standard medical procedure, which would have been to direct P to see an ophthalmologist on an emergency basis. The ship's doctor recommended that P relax until he could see an eye specialist two days later. No attempt was made to transport P ashore for prompt medical care by means of a pilot vessel or helicopter during the 11 hours it took the ship to reach the open sea from Baltimore, and P received no further medical care until after the ship arrived in Bermuda. In Bermuda, a doctor diagnosed a detached retina and recommended immediate hospitalization and surgery. P lost 75 percent of his vision in his right eye. Following his recuperation P resumed his duties with D. P continued to work for D until November 1990, when his employment was terminated for reasons that are not clear from the record. In October 1991, P filed suit seeking compensatory damages under the Jones Act for the negligence of the ship's doctor that resulted in the significant loss of sight in P's right eye. The District Court instructed the jury that it could conclude that Latsis was a seaman within the meaning of the statute if it found as follows: 'The plaintiff was either permanently assigned to the vessel or performed a substantial part of his work on the vessel. In determining whether P performed a substantial part of his work on the vessel, you may not consider the period of time the Galileo was in drydock in Germany, because during that time period she was out of navigation. You may, however, consider the time spent sailing to and from Germany for the conversion. Also, on this first element of being a seaman, seamen do not include land-based workers.' The jury returned a verdict in favor of D solely on the issue of P’s status as a seaman under the Jones Act. The Second Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. Its longstanding test for seaman status under the Jones Act required ''a more or less permanent connection with the ship,'' a connection that need not be limited to time spent on the vessel but could also be established by the nature of the work performed. The court concluded that the District Court's seaman status jury instructions constituted plain error under established Circuit precedent. The court then held: 'The test of seaman status under the Jones Act is an employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation. The test will be met where a jury finds that (1) the plaintiff contributed to the function of, or helped accomplish the mission of, a vessel; (2) the plaintiff's contribution was limited to a particular vessel or identifiable group of vessels; (3) the plaintiff's contribution was substantial in terms of its (a) duration or (b) nature; and (4) the course of the plaintiff's employment regularly exposed the plaintiff to the hazards of the sea.' The court phrased the third prong as requiring a substantial connection in terms of both duration and nature. D appealed.
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